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Doyle HARTMAN, an individual, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 17094. 
Supreme Court of New Mexico. 
Oct. 4, 1988. 
Rehearing Denied Nov. 2, 1988. 
Seller and producer of oil and gas 
brought breach of contract action against 
buyer and sought permanent injunction re-
quiring buyer to abide by and perform its 
obligations under contracts. The District 
Court of Lea County, Larry Johnson, D.J., 
entered judgment on jury verdict in favor 
"of producer and issued permanent injunc-
tion, and buyer appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Sosa, Senior Justice, held that: (1) 
neither Natural Gas Act nor Natural Gas 
Policy Act precluded state court from de-
ciding contractual issues involving gas pur-
chase contracts which were regulated tan-
gentially and peripherally by federal stat-
utes; (2) striking buyer's affirmative de-
fenses alleging applicability of force maj-
eure clauses of contracts was not errone-
ous where clauses were used to force pro-
ducer into submitting to buyer's scheme to 
manipulate Oil Conservation Division's 
mandate to producer as to how much gas 
he could produce and to compel producer to 
do business only on buyer's terms; (3) trial 
court did not infringe on jurisdiction of Oil 
Conservation Division in deciding that buy-
er manipulated Division's mandate to pro-
ducer as to how much gas he could pro-
duce; and (4) buyer waived attorney-client 
privilege to allegedly protected documents 
by inadvertently producing documents. 
Affirmed. 
1. Gas <s=*13(l) 
States <s=»18.15 
Neither the Natural Gas Act nor the 
Natural Gas Policy Act precluded state 
court from deciding contractual issues in-
volving gas purchase contracts which were 
regulated tangentially and peripherally by 
federal statutes. Natural Gas Act, §§ 1-
24, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 717-717w; Natural Gas 
Policy Act of 1978, §§ 2-602, 15 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 3301-3432; Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act of 1978, §§ 605-607, 15 U.S. 
C.A. §§ 717x-717z. 
2. Gas <3=»13U) 
Force majeure clauses of gas purchase 
contracts could not be used to force produc-
er into submitting to buyer's scheme to 
manipulate Oil Conservation Division's 
mandate to producer as to how much gas 
producer could produce, and to compel pro-
ducer to do business only on buyer's terms, 
where buyer had assumed risk of changing 
market demands. 
3. Mines and Minerals <s=*92.64 
In breach of contract action brought 
by producer of oil against buyer of oil and 
gas, trial court did not infringe on jurisdic-
tion of Oil Conservation Division when de-
ciding, as part of contract action, that buy-
er manipulated Division's mandate to pro-
ducer as to how much gas he could pro-
duce. 
4. Witnesses e=>219(3) 
Litigant waived attorney-client privi-
lege to documents where litigant inadvert-
ently produced documents to opponent. 
5. Pretrial Procedure <s=»34 
Witnesses <s=219(3) 
In determining whether document has 
lost its attorney-client privilege or work-
product immunity by inadvertent disclosure 
to opponent, court should consider reason-
ableness of precautions taken to prevent 
inadvertent disclosure in view of extent of 
document production, number of inadver-
tent disclosures, extent of disclosure, delay 
and measures taken to rectify disclosure, 
and whether overriding interests of justice 
would be served by relieving party of its 
error. 
6. Appeal and Error <s=»1043(6) 
Order requiring production of addition-
al documents after two documents alleg-
edly subject to attorney-client privilege 
were inadvertently produced was not preju-
HARTMAN v. EL PASO NATURAL GAS CO. 
Cite as 763 P-2d 1144 (N.M. 1988) 
N.M. 1145 
dicial to client where inadvertently produc-
ed documents were sufficient in and of 
themselves to substantiate opponent's alle-
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OPINION 
SOSA, Senior Justice. 
PART ONE: PROCEDURAL CONTEXT 
A. AMENDED COMPLAINT 
On September 12, 1986, plaintiff-appellee, 
Doyle Hartman (Hartman), filed his amend-
ed complaint against defendant-appellant, 
El Paso Natural Gas Company (El Paso), 
alleging that El Paso had intentionally and 
maliciously breached various gas purchase 
contracts entered into between Hartman as 
seller-producer and El Paso as purchaser-
pipeline. Hartman also alleged certain tor-
tious conduct, violations of the New Mexico 
Antitrust Act, and sought a permanent in-
junction requiring El Paso to abide by and 
perform its obligations under the buy-sell 
contracts, to cease and desist from "shut-
ting in" (closing down) certain of Hart-
man's wells, and requesting certain other 
minor injunctive relief. For purposes of 
this appeal, the relevant portions of Hart-
man's amended complaint are those allega-
tions pertaining to breach of contract and 
the two items of injunctive relief specified 
above. Hartman sought both compensato-
ry and punitive damages. 
EL PASO'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENS-
ES 
In addition to filing a general denial of 
Hartman's claims, El Paso, on several occa-
sions, filed certain affirmative defenses. 
The most recently filed and only relevant 
affirmative defenses, insofar as this appeal 
is concerned, are as follows: (i) El Paso's 
force majeure defense, in which it alleged 
that it was excused from performance un-
der the contracts at issue because "there 
had been an unforseeable collapse of mar-
ket demand in the middle portion of" the 
1980's, coupled with new state and federal 
regulations which substantially changed 
the scope and thrust of the contracts at 
issue; (ii) El Paso's commercial impractica-
bility and frustration of purpose defenses, 
in which it alleged that policies of the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) "erode[d] the demand for higher 
priced [i.e., Hartman's] gas produced under 
contract to the [various gas] pipelines," 
thereby excusing its performance under 
the contracts; (iii) that enforcement of the 
contracts at issue would violate public poli-
cy, as determined by the State of New 
Mexico's Energy, Minerals and Natural Re-
sources Department, and the Oil Conserva-
tion Division thereof (OCD), thereby excus-
ing El Paso from performance of the con-
tracts at issue; (iv) that the entire sub-
stance of the contracts at issue was (a) 
pre-empted by federal law and regulations 
promulgated thereunder by FERC, and (b) 
irreparably transformed to El Paso's detri-
ment by regulations promulgated by 
FERC, OCD, and the California Public Util-
ities Commission, thereby excusing El 
Paso's performance under the contracts at 
issue. 
C. PRE-TRIAL ORDERS 
The parties filed various pre-trial mo-
tions, the full extent of which is not rele-
vant to this appeal. Certain orders, how-
ever, issued by the trial court in response 
to these motions, constitute the core of El 
Paso's appeal: 
(i) the court's "Order Pursuant to Rule 
56(d), N.M.R.Civ.P [sic]" (correctly cited as 
SCRA 1986, 1-056(D)), 1986, which elimi-
1146 NM. 763 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
nated from the case, as a matter of law, a 
major portion of El Paso's affirmative de-
fenses, as to Jive of the natural gas con-
tracts 
(n) the court's "Partial Summary Judg-
ment on the Oil Well Casmghead Con-
tracts," issued on November 12, 1986, 
which concluded that El Paso was "liable to 
take all of the gas under the Oil Well 
Casmghead Contracts l and to pay for such 
gas at the contract price " (Emphasis add-
ed) 
(in) the court's "Order Striking Defens-
es" issued December 2, 1986, which extend-
ed the above ruling to the remainder of the 
contracts at issue Thus, by December 2, 
1986, all of El Paso's affirmative defenses 
as to all contracts at issue in this case 
had, as a matter of law, been stricken, 
(iv) the court's "Order Denying [El 
Paso's] Motion for Reconsideration," issued 
on October 1, 1986, which upheld the 
court's earlier ruling that El Paso, in "inad-
vertently producing" certain documents 
and giving these documents to Hartman's 
counsel, waived its attorney-client privilege 
as to those documents Further, by the 
same order, the court ruled that El Paso 
had also waived work-product immunity 
"on the same subject matter," and thus 
required El Paso to produce certain other 
pertinent documents For reference infra, 
these documents came to be numbered as 
Hartman's exhibits, beginning with Num-
ber 124, the crucial "inadvertent doc-
ument" triggering production of doc-
uments later numbered as exhibits 104, 
120, 137, 146, 154, 206 and 207 The prac-
tical consequence of the court's order was 
to require El Paso to produce confidential, 
1. As will be developed in more detail later in 
this opinion, there were thirty three contracts 
governing the sale and purchase of casmghead 
gas, and forty three contracts governing the sale 
and purchase of gas produced from natural gas 
wells Casing-Head Gas is defined as 'Natu 
ral gas from an oil well, saturated with oil 
vapors or gasoline Black s Law Dictionary 273 
(4th ed rev 1968) The gas produced from 
natural gas wells, on the other hand, is com 
monly termed 'dry gas 
2. The court allowed El Paso 'a credit against 
dry gas takes from non marginal wells in pools 
presently classified as prorated for the jury 
award of $2 153 000 in compensatory damages ' 
m-house information written by ,key El 
Paso personnel during the period July 1, 
1982 to June 18, 1986, a period when the 
events complained of in Hartman's amend-
ed complaint were taking place 
D TRIAL, JURY VERDICT AND JUDG-
MENT ON THE VERDICT 
Jury trial lasted from December 1 to 
December 19, 1986 The jury found in 
favor of Hartman and awarded him $2,153,-
000 in compensatory damages 2 and $1,080,-
000 in punitive damages The court en-
tered judgment on the verdict on January 
22, 1987, awarding post-judgment interest 
on the combined damages at the rate of 
fifteen percent 
E PERMANENT INJUNCTION 
On March 24 1987, the court issued its 
permanent injunction, issued thirty-five 
findings of fact and ten conclusions of law, 
and ruled, m pertinent part, as follows (I) 
El Paso is required, as to the contracts 
covering Hartman's dry gas wells, to take 
Hartman's dry gas "in the maximum pro-
portion of dehverabihty3 that gas is being 
produced within the terms of the applicable 
ratable take4 provisions" of the contracts 
involved, (n) El Paso is required, as to the 
contracts covenng Hartman's castnghead 
wells and gas wells in oil pools, to "take 
and pay contract pnce for all gas produced 
by casmghead wells and by gas wells in oil 
pools, up to allowable limits5 for casing 
head gas as defined" by certain regulations 
of the OCD, (in) El Paso is required to 
"exercise good faith in the manner in which 
according to a complicated formula which is 
not relevant to our determination of the issues 
on appeal 
3. As to the concept of maximum proportion of 
dehverabihty,' see generally, NMSA 1978, 
§§ 70-2-1 to -38, known as the 'Oil and Gas 
Act,* and in particular § 70-2-16(C) 
4 As to the concept of 'ratable take,' see the 
balance of this opinion, infra 
5. As to the concept of 'allowable limits,' see 
NMSA 1978, § 70-2-16(C) 
HARTMAN v EL PAS 
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it performs" the requirements mandated by 
the permanent injunction 
F ISSUES RAISED BY EL PASO ON 
APPEAL 
On appeal, El Paso contends (I) that the 
trial court's jurisdiction to decide this case 
was pre-empted by federal law, (n) that 
genuine issues of material fact existed as 
to the stricken affirmative defenses, (in) 
that the OCD's jurisdiction pre-empted that 
of the trial court as to "nominations and 
allowables," * and (iv) that the trial court 
abused its discretion m ruling against El 
Paso as to the documents which El Paso 
alleged were protected from discovery by 
attorney client privilege and work product 
immunity Accordingly, EI Paso asks us to 
reverse and vacate the jury verdict and 
judgment thereon and quash the perma-
nent injunction, or in the alternative, to 
vacate the judgment and remand the cause 
for a new trial in which El Paso is permit 
ted "to introduce evidence substantiating 
its affirmative defenses,' and in which "the 
jury not be permitted to hear evidence or 
arguments concerning the privileged or im-
mune documents at issue " 
G OUR HOLDING ON APPEAL 
We reject each of El Paso's contentions 
on appeal, affirm the trial court's judgment 
on the jury verdict, and order El Paso to 
abide by and honor, in good faith and in 
detail, the trial court's permanent injunc-
tion 
PART TWO FACTS 
A GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORI-
CAL BACKGROUND 
El Paso is a natural gas transporting and 
sales company, whose pipelines intersect 
the Permian Basin in Texas and New Mexi-
co, the Anadarko Basin m Oklahoma, and 
the San Juan Basin m New Mexico On 
appeal, the relevant pools of natural gas 
involved are the Eumont Pool and the Jal-
mat Pool, both located in southeastern New 
Mexico Hartman is a producer of natural 
gas, and operates wells which pump gas 
from the Eumont and Jalmat pools Most 
O NATURAL GAS CO. N M H 4 7 
1144 ( N M 1988) 
of Hartman's wells lie in Lea and Eddy 
counties, New Mexico Hartman operates 
some 95 dry gas wells on acreage dedicated 
to El Paso under the contracts at issue El 
Paso's pipeline runs in roughly a north by 
northwest direction through the Jalmat and 
Eumont pools, which are located south to 
southwest of Hobbs, New Mexico 
For some reason, neither party on appeal 
has chosen to state when their contractual 
relationship began From the record, how-
ever, we can glean enough information to 
conclude that well before 1982 the parties 
had been enjoying a mutually satisfactory 
and profitable relationship 
Our opinion would be too exhaustive to 
read if we were to quote extensively from 
all of the documents produced before and 
during trial Thus, we shall quote only 
from the "triggering memo," relevant to 
the lower court's order of October 1, 1986, 
Exhibit 124, written to an El Paso execu-
tive by El Paso's m house attorney, on May 
24, 1984 Before summarizing relevant 
statutes in Oklahoma, Texas and New Mex-
ico, the attorney states the purpobe of his 
memo to be "the extent of El Pasof's] 
* * * obligation to take ratably across its 
system and the extent of El Paso's ability 
to take more gas from less expensive sys-
tems This memorandum sets forth my 
conclusions ' The attorney's conclusions 
were as follows 
There are, however, certain risks to 
adopting such a limited least cost produc-
tion scheduling policy While El Paso 
could continue to raise the argument 
that, since it is complying with the letter 
of all applicable ratable take statutes, it 
is excused from prepayment obligations 
under take-or-pay contracts, a great deal 
of the persuasive force behind El Paso's 
position would have been lost Produc-
ers which formerly were convinced not to 
press prepayment claims, because of 
their belief that El Paso was being fair 
and evenhanded, would likely file law-
suits claiming prepayments Such suits 
could cover not only the current year but 
any past year in which El Paso's takes, 
though ratable across its system, were 
less than the contractual minimum Be-
6. See id. 
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cause of the tendency to settle lawsuits 
rather than litigate, especially where the 
defenses are untested and questionable, 
a flood of lawsuits would doubtless re-
sult in a large amount of negotiated pre-
payments This, of course, would lead to 
higher resale prices and possible lower 
sales, thereby aggravating El Paso's de-
liverabihty surplus and prepayment prob-
lem 
This memo inspired El Paso's decision 
makers to formulate its "least-cost produc-
tion" strategy, as spelled out in other dis-
puted documents, and m its May 1986 
"Strategic Plan " This plan had already 
been outlined to producers, including Hart-
man, in El Paso's "Notice to Sellers," dated 
February 28, 1986 In that notice, El Paso 
advised Hartman 
El Paso intends to modify its production-
scheduling procedures in a manner that 
maximizes, to the extent practicable and 
legally permissible, the purchases of gas 
from El Paso's lowest cost sources of 
supply 
* * * * * * 
El Paso must take immediate action to 
reduce its sales rates 
* * * * * * 
If El Paso's pnce becomes noncompeti-
tive * * * with other gas supplies or with 
alternative fuels, El Paso may be forced 
to take more drastic price actions or to 
make further modification to its produc-
tion-scheduling procedures We will 
strive to keep you informed if such ac-
tions become necessary 
The trial court found that El Paso ig-
nored the ratable take provisions of its 
contracts with Hartman, and instead fa-
vored its own affiliates, notably "Meridi-
an," and "Southland Royalty," m purchas-
es of gas The jury found that El Paso 
"nominated" or predicted m bad faith how 
much of Hartman's allowable production it 
would take El Paso had created El Paso 
Gas Marketing Company to enter into and 
compete with other purchasers on the spot 
market, and to submit joint nominations 
with El Paso for purchasable gas The 
record shows that El Paso and El Paso Gas 
Marketing Company were essentially inter-
changeable names for the same entity 
Since the allowable limits which the OCD 
established in its rules and regulations 
were to a large degree determined by pre-
vious purchasing patterns, the OCD's set-
ting of allowables for Hartman's wells was 
based largely on EI Paso's own purchasing 
volume To that extent, the court found 
that El Paso manipulated the OCD's man-
date to Hartman as to how much gas he 
could produce As El Paso reduced its 
purchases from the Jalmat and Eumont 
Pools, for example, the OCD's determina-
tion of Hartman's allowables would de-
crease commensurately On April 21, 1986, 
El Paso wrote to Hartman and other pro-
ducers, announcing, "El Paso hereby pro-
poses to release you from your commit-
ment, under applicable contracts * * * " 
In his amended complaint, Hartman al-
leged that beginning January 1, 1985, El 
Paso "unilaterally reduced the price paid 
for dry gas actually taken from certain of 
[his] wells," and that beginning June 1, 
1986, "El Paso has unilaterally reduced the 
price paid for oil well casinghead gas and 
gas well casinghead gas taken under the 
Contracts " The trial court found that El 
Paso's actions were "in wanton disregard 
of [Hartman's] contractual rights " 
El Paso's net worth in 1985 was $1,069,-
258,000, while m 1986 its net worth had 
increased to $1,140,300,000 Hartman filed 
his original complaint on April 8, 1986, fol-
lowing El Paso's "shutting in" (closing 
down) of some eighty-five of his wells 
These wells remained shut in until the 
court issued its permanent injunction 
B NATURE OF THE CONTRACTS 
BREACHED 
The contracts involved here are varied, 
complex and lengthy We shall speak of 
four vaneties of contracts containing rata-
ble take clauses These contracts cover 
both Hartman's prorated gas, that is, gas 
covered by the "allowable" system defined 
in NMSA 1978, Section 70-2-16, and perti-
nent OCD regulations, as well as his non-
prorated gas Generally speaking, the 
four varieties of ratable take contracts re-
quire that El Paso purchase gas from the 
prorated pools in some stated pro-rata por-
tion of Hartman's allowable limit of pro-
HARTMAN v. EL PAS 
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duction, and at full dehverabihty for his 
non-prorated wells. There is, in addition, 
a type of contract clause designated by the 
parties as a "Type 5 Ratable Take Clause," 
which in actuality simply restates El Paso's 
obligation to purchase gas under all con-
tracts up to allowable limits 
In addition to this classification system, 
the parties by stipulation classified the con-
tracts according to "Wells for Which Dam-
ages Have Been Claimed For Alleged Non-
Ratable Taking" (81 of such weHs), "Wells 
for Which Price Claims Have Been Made" 
(32 of such wells), and "Wells on Which No 
Damages Have Been Claimed" (38 of such 
wells) With reference to the first two 
catagones of wells discussed in this para-
graph, there is overlap, in that some wells 
fall into both categories, while wells in the 
third category discussed in this paragraph 
are covered by the permanent injunction 
but were not wells for which contract dam-
ages were claimed 
The trial court based its conclusion of 
irreparable damage to Hartman largely on 
the fact that ninety two percent of Hart-
man s gas production is subject to his con-
tracts with El Paso, and that ninety five 
percent of his income is derived from his 
Lea County production The trial court 
found, based on the record as we have 
summarized it, that "[b]ecause of [El 
Paso's] ongoing breach of its contracts 
with [Hartman], [Hartman] will continue to 
suffer a substantial loss of revenue, inhibit-
ing his present and future ability to explore 
for, produce and sell natural gas " 
PART THREE LEGAL ISSUES 
RAISED ON APPEAL 
A WAS THE TRIAL COURT'S JURIS-
DICTION PRE-EMPTED BY FEDER 
AL LAW? OUR DECISION NO 
[1] El Paso argues for an affirmative 
answer to this question by citing several 
Supreme Court and federal cases which are 
inapposite The pnncipal error El Paso 
makes is to confuse cases involving pipe-
lines versus consumers, on the one hand, 
and state regulatory agencies' decisions 
versus federal statutory authonty, on the 
other The present appeal involves neither 
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of these issues It is a contract case, and 
neither the Natural Gas Act (NGA) nor the 
Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA)7 precludes 
a state court from deciding issues involving 
oil and gas contracts which are regulated 
tangentially and peripherally, insofar as 
the legal issues herein are concerned 
Thus, contrary to what El Paso argues, 
Northern Natural Gas Co v State Corp 
Commission of Kansas, 372 U S 84, 83 
SCt 646, 9 LEd2d 601 (1963), did not 
prohibit the trial court here from asserting 
jurisdiction In that case the principal con-
tract at issue was not before the Supreme 
Court on appeal Further, the producer of 
natural gas was not a party to the suit 
Northern Natural Gas Co involved a 
state agency's entanglement in federal af-
fairs The case before us involves the is-
sue of a private party attempting to en-
force a private contract against a corpora-
tion Likewise, Transcontinental Gas 
Pipe Line Corp v State Oil and Gas 
Board of Mississippi, 474 U S 409, 106 
S Ct 709, 88 L Ed 2d 732 (1986), relied on 
by El Paso, is not on point In that case, 
the issue was similar to the issue raised in 
Northern Further, the Court in Trans-
continental Gas Pipe Line Corp explicitly 
distinguished between FERC's jurisdiction 
and the role which free market forces must 
play in oil and gas contracts such as the 
one before us 
To the extent that Congress denied 
FERC the power to regulate affirmative-
ly particular aspects of the first sale of 
gas, it did so because it wanted to leave 
determination of supply and first-sale 
pnce to the market 
Id at 422, 106 S Ct at 717 
In actuality, the issue which El Paso 
raises as to federal pre-emption versus 
freedom of contract has long been settled 
"Neither the NGPA nor the NGA expressly 
preempt the application of state contract 
law to the interpretation of gas purchase 
contracts" Pennzoil Co v FERC, 645 
F 2d 360, 384 (5th Cir 1981), see also Ten-
neco Oil Co v El Paso Natural Gas, 687 
P 2d 1049 (Okla 1984), and International 
Minerals & Chem Corp v Llano, 770 
F 2d 879 (10th Cir 1985) cert denied, 475 
7. 15 U S C §§ 717 to -717z (1982) and 15 U S C §§ 3301 to -3432 (1982). respectively 
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U.S. 1015, 106 S.Ct. 1196, 89 L.Ed.2d 310 
(1986) (presumption of freedom of contract 
under state law without interference either 
by FERC's regulations or restraints im-
posed by the NGA or the NGPA). Cf 
Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 
F.2d 981, 1025-26 (D.C.Cir.i987), cert, de-
nied, — U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 1468, 99 
L.Ed.2d 698 (1988) (where, although the 
court disagreed with FERC's reasoning as 
to issuance of its Order No. 436,* it did 
nothing to limit the private contract prerog-
atives of either pipelines or producers). 
As we held in Ashlock v. Sunwest Bank 
of Roswell, 107 N.M. 100, 103, 753 P.2d 
346, 349 (1988), so too here, we hold that 
state (contract) law and federal regulation 
are not in conflict, and *rus there is no 
pre-emption by any applicable federal stat-
ute, 
B. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN 
STRIKING EL PASO'S AFFIRMA-
TIVE DEFENSES? OUR DECISION: 
NO. 
As to this issue, we agree with the rea-
soning employed by the court in granting 
summary judgment in Thomas N Berry £ 
Co. v. Northern Natural Gas Co., No. 
CIV-85-1430-R (W.D.Okla. May 15, 1986): 
[T]he defendant seems to labor under the 
misconception that it is the plaintiffs 
burden not only to prove its prima facie 
case, * * * but also to prove that the 
defendant has no affirmative defenses. 
Consequently, as the defendant has 
failed to submit any credible evidence to 
show issues of material fact exist as to 
[its] defenses, summary judgment will be 
granted to them * * *. 
El Paso is right to argue on appeal that 
"[sjummary judgment is a drastic remedy 
to be used with great caution." Pharma-
seal Laboratories, Inc. v. Goffe, 90 N.M 
753, 756, 568 P.2d 589, 592 (1977). H*--> 
however, the court cautiously and pru 
ly applied the drastic remedy that 
needed. 
8. For Order No. 436, see 50 Fed.Reg. 42.408 
(1985). In this case FERC's order was vacated 
and remanded for further proceedings because 
FERC inadequately addressed itself to "take-or-
pay" problems raised by the issues before it. 
Footnote 25 of the decision, however, notes, "No 
Trial courts have consistently
 f struck 
down defenses which have no basis in ei-
ther fact or law, as was the case here. See 
International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 
holding in a natural gas seller's favor on 
the issue of a force majeure clause, where 
a buyer complied with a regulation of the 
New Mexico Environmental Improvement 
Board requiring the seller to shut down 
certain parts of its potash processing facili-
ty near Carlsbad. The buyer unsuccessful-
ly sought a declaratory judgment in the 
United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Mexico, asking to be excused 
from its performance under the contract 
with the seller because of the force maj-
eure clause. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed with 
the trial court on the issue of force maj-
eure, but reversed the trial court's decision 
because "there was no technically suitable 
way for [the plaintiff] to comply with [the 
state's regulation] without shutting down 
* * * " its operation. 770 F.2d at 887 (em-
phasis added). In the case before us, the 
shoe is on the other foot. It is Hartman 
who is being "shut down," not El Paso, and 
by El Paso's actions. 
[2] The force majeure clauses of the 
pertinent contracts before us may not be 
sanctioned when used to force a producer 
into submitting to a seller's scheme and 
compel him to do business only on the 
seller's terms, as was the case here. The 
Supreme Court has taken a similar ap-
proach in Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v, 
Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 
103 S.Ct. 697, 74 L.Ed.2d 569 (1983), where-
in it held that a Kansas statute regulating 
the price of natural gas in a buy-sell agree-
ment entered into between a Kansas public 
utility and an energy company did not void 
the parties' contractual obligations. See 
also Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 
176, 103 S.Ct. 2296, 76 L.Ed.2d 497 (1983). 
As the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit has ruled: 
party here presents any argument for a view 
that FERC could exercise its § 5 power to modi-
fy nonjurisdictional wellhead contracts," Asso-
ciated Gas Distributors at 1022. The contracts 
at issue in the case before us are purely and 
simply "nonjurisdictional wellhead contracts." 
HARTMAN v. EL PASO NATURAL GAS CO, 
Cite • •763 P.2d 1144 (N.M. 1988) 
N.M. 1151 
Since impossibility and related doctrines 
are devices for shifting risk in accord-
ance with the parties' presumed inten-
tions, which are to minimize the costs of 
contract performance, one of which is the 
disutility created by risk, they have no 
place when the contract explicitly assigns 
a particular risk to one party or the 
other. 
Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Car-
bon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 278 
(7th Cir.1986). We likewise agree with the 
court in Resources Investment Corp. v. 
Enron Corp., 669 F.Supp. 1038, 1043 
(D.Colo. 1987), when it ruled: 
[T]he parties clearly contemplated the 
likelihood of changing economic condi-
tions, including alterations in fuel price 
levels "and such fluctuation was not the 
kind of completely unforeseeable event 
required to invoke the doctrine of frus-
tration of purpose," [United States of 
America v. Great Plains Gasification 
Associates, et aL, 819 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 
1987)] at p. 835. "This court will not 
hold a contract to be frustrated merely 
because of an increase in cost to one of 
the parties." Ross Industries v. M/V 
Gretke Oldendorff 483 F.Supp. 195, 
199-200 (E.D.Tex.1980).... Similar con-
siderations govern the claim based upon 
impossibility and commercial impractica-
bility. 
In the case before us, the affirmative 
defenses were devoid of any real contact 
with the facts, and the trial court prudently 
struck them from the case. If there was 
any risk to be assumed, it was El Paso 
which assumed it. 
C. DID THE TRIAL COURT LACK SUB-
JECT MATTER JURISDICTION IN 
MAKING FACTUAL DETERMINA-
TIONS AS TO CERTAIN MATTERS 
INVOLVING OCD REGULATIONS? 
OUR DECISION: NO. 
[3] In its brief-in-chief, El Paso claimed 
the trial court "committed fundamental er-
ror by intruding into an area within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the New Mexico 
OCD. This occurred when the court con-
sidered Hartman's claim that the process 
established by the OCD for setting allow-
ables under its proration scheme is no long-
er effective, when it adjudicated the relia-
bility of the OCD system of nominations 
and allowables, and when it altered subse-
quent allowables without taking into ac-
count any of the factors required by stat-
ute or OCD regulations to be considered in 
setting allowables in order to conserve nat-
ural resources and prevent waste." The 
problem with this contention is that the 
trial court did none of the things of which 
El Paso accuses it. The trial court never 
ruled that OCD's system "is no longer ef-
fective." Nor did the trial court take any 
action to "adjudicate the reliability of the 
OCD system." Finally, it was El Paso, and 
not the trial court, which "altered allow-
ables" through its manipulation of the mar-
ket. 
We take El Paso's contention on this 
issue to be a variety of the public rights vs. 
private rights argument resolved by the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Tenneco 
Oil Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. Quot-
ing from Northern Pipeline Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 
2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982), the court stat-
ed: 
[I]t suffices to observe that a matter of 
public rights must at a minimum arise 
"between the government and others." 
In contrast, lithe liability of one individ-
ual to another under the law as de-
fined, " is a matter of private rights 
* * *. Private-rights disputes m * * lie 
at the core of the historically recog-
nized judicial power. 
687 P.2d at 1053-1054 (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
The case before us is not one involving 
"the government and others." It is a con-
tract case, involving a private individual 
and a corporation. The trial court did not 
infringe on the jurisdiction of the OCD. 
D. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN 
RULING THAT EL PASO HAD 
WAIVED ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE AND WORK-PRODUCT 
IMMUNITY INSOFAR AS THE DIS-
PUTED DOCUMENTS ARE CON-
CERNED? OUR DECISION: NO. 
[4] This is an issue of first impression 
in New Mexico. We take as our starting 
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point the principle stated by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit: "It is axiomatic that the burden is 
on a party claiming the protection of a 
privilege to establish those facts that are 
the essential elements of the privileged re-
lationship." von Bulow by Auersperg v. 
;->n Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2nd Cir.), 
crrt denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 
95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987). 
El Paso argues its point by way of analo-
gy to contract law, asserting the equitable 
defense of mistake of fact, in that it inad-
vertently produced two of the allegedly 
protected documents before the court or-
dered it to produce the others. See Albu-
querque Nat'l Bank v. Albuquerque 
Ranch Estates, Inc., 99 N.M. 95, 654 P.2d 
548 (1982); Talley v. Sec. Serv. Corp., 99 
N.M. 702, 663 P.2d 361 (1983). El Paso 
bases its argument in favor of a rule sup-
porting its position on a case that is fre-
quently cited as foundational on this issue, 
Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 
F.Supp. 951 (N.D.I11.1982), where the court 
held that counsel's inadvertent productior 
of privileged letters to its adversary in a 
patent infringement action did not consti 
tute waiver of the attorney-client privilege 
We disagree with El Paso that the rule ir 
Mendenhall v Barber-Greene Co. shoulc 
be the New Mexico rule governing this 
issue. Instead, we favor the approach tak 
en by the court in Hartford Fire Insur-
ance Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323 (N.D. 
Cal.1985). There the court spoke of the 
rule in Mendenhall as being of weak prece-
dential value and not the majority rule. Id. 
at 329. Our study of this issue persuade^ 
us that the court in Hartford Fire Insur 
ance Co. v. Garvey was right in its assess-
ment; 
"Phe modern trend seems to be towards 
a case by case determination of waiver 
jased on a consideration of all circum-
stances. The majority of cases do hold 
or take for granted, that inadvertent dis-
closure of privileged documents may 
waive the privilege. * * * The "inad-
vertence" of the production is considered 
as one factor in determining vr*»th-
there has been a waiver. 
Id. at 329-30 (citations omitted). 
The court in Parkway Gallery Furn 
hire, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania 
House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46 (M.D N 
C.1987), while not extending the waiver oi 
privilege to documents not already inad-
vertently produced, descnbed the general 
principle behind the modern trend, as fol-
lows: 
Notwithstanding its ancient roots and 
modern necessity, the [attorney-client] 
privilege must be strictly construed to 
ensure that it does not unduly impinge 
Oil the more general, overriding duty of 
insisting that investigations and deci-
sions be based on truth and reality as 
opposed to fiction or fabrication. 
Td at 49 (citation omitted). 
[5] The court then listed fiv t factors 
-hieh should assist a court in determining 
-nether a document has lost its privilege 
(1) The reasonableness of the precau 
tions taken to prevent inadvertent disclc^ 
sure in view of the extent of the doc-
ument production; (2) the number of in-
advertent disclosures; (3) the extent of 
the disclosure; (4) any delay and mea-
sures taken to rectify the disclosures; (5) 
whether the overriding interests of jus-
tice would be served by relieving a part^ 
of its error. 
d. at 50. 
When measuring El Paso's conduct by 
these factors, we find its conduct lacking. 
Therefore, we hold that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in ordering El Paso 
to produce the documents. 
[6] The above criteria pertain both to 
the trial court's determination of the issue 
of attorney-client privilege as well as to its 
determination of the issue of work-product 
immunity. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 109 
F.R.D. at 327. As for the additional doc-
uments ordered to be produced, we con-
clude that the two inadvertently produced 
documents were sufficient in and of them-
selves to substantiate Hartman's allega-
tions concerning the subject matter of 
those documents. Hence, since the cat was 
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already out of the bag, as far as the jury's Supreme Court, Walters, J , held that: (1) 
- z- ,edge of El Paso's conduct is con- intermediate or heightened scrutiny test 
-r- . ec z was not prejudicial to El Paso's applied to equal protection challenge to cap 
*= rial court to order production in statute; (2) cap in dramshop statute was 
- -r_ --u.nnal documents, unconstitutional; and (3) a majority of the 
court was unable to reach agreement on 
PART FOUR. CONCLU8!r ,N 4ND whether dump truck owner was liable for 
SUMMARY OF OUR HOLDING negligence 
ON APPEAL R e v e r s e - - a r t ana ^ - - - a m . - . 
To summarize, we affirm the trial court s 
udgment on the verdict, and order PI Paso 
*o comply strictly, in detail and in good 
-aith, with the trial court's permanent in-
duction, 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
SCARBOROUGH «\- and 
STOWEES, J., concur 
- !«|¥NUH§H • «•» 
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Gayle D. RICHARDSON, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Wade 
Fitzsimmons Richardson, Deceased, Pe-
Titioner, 
v. 
C Z IE LIBRARY RESTAURANT, 
z b ' a The Country Connection, 
anc ---nnett-Cathey, Inc., Respondents. 
No. 17432. 
Supr-—- Court of New Mexico 
Oct. 18, 1988, 
Reheanngs Denied Nov, 21 1988. 
Personal representative of decedent 
killed in automobile-dump truck accident 
brought suit against dramshop operator 
who served alcohol to driver of stolen 
dump truck and owner of dump truck. The 
District Court, Harvey W. Fort, D.J., grant-
ed summary judgment to dump truck own-
er and limited dramshop's liability to cap in 
statr* The Court of Appeals affirmed in 
an J blished decision. On certiorari, the 
Ranso— I ^ : J ^rred n 
opinion. 
S towe^ ~ n—e—**1 Mth opinio 
1, Amicus Curiae ^=3 
Plaintiffs statement at trial that dam-
age cap in Dramshop Act violated State 
Constitution was insufficient to preserve 
issues of separation of powers or state due 
process on appeal through amicus briefs. 
2. Amicus Curiae e=»3 
Plaintiffs failure to demand a jury tn-
a m timely manner waived amicus curiae 
aoility to brief on how dramshop damage 
recovery cap violated state right to jury 
trial. SCRA 1986, Rule 1-038, subd. D. 
3 Constitutional Law «=245(3) 
Claim of tort victims affected by dam-
ape cap in dramshop liability act was at 
least sensitive enough to injustice wrought 
to warrant application of intermediate or 
heightened scrutiny test in state equal pro-
tection challenge to the cap. Cons- Art. 2, 
§ 4; NMSA 1978, §§ 41-11-1 ^ =11-1, 
subd. I. 
4, Constitutional Law ®=*209 
Test for reviewing equal protection 
challenges are generally the same under 
New Mexico and federal law; minimum 
scrutiny also known as rational basis test, 
strict scrutiny, and intermediate or height-
ened scrutiny. Const. Art. 2, § 18; U.S.C. 
A. Const.Amend. 14. 
5, Constitutional Law <s=>48(l) 
Legislative acts are presumptively vai-
a and normally are subject to rational ba 
sis test, and will not be declared invalic 
unless court is clearly satisfied that legisla 
ture went outside Constitution in enacting 
them. 
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g to have an otherwise valid judgment 
clared void, but is merely asking for rec-
pnition of the fact that the previous judg-
ent is a legal nullity. Venue, on the 
her hand, is simply a privilege extended 
each defendant, and is deemed to be 
fcived unless a timely objection is inter-
red. 1 J. Moore, Federal Practice, 
).146[6] (2d ed. 1988). Defendant Lepore 
d not question venue during the pendency 
k
 the federal action and, indeed, has yet to 
terpose any objection to venue being laid 
the district of Arizona. Accordingly, 
lere is no basis for finding that the feder-
default judgment is void or that the 
>rtions of the action subjudice that relate 
) that judgment should be dismissed. The 
efendant's motion should therefore be de-
led.7 
IV. 
[61 Counts Two through Six of the 
resent complaint involve the allegedly 
raudulent conveyance of real property 
rom defendant Lepore to the corporate 
efendant, Ultra Service, Inc. Pursuant to 
federal Rule 64 md Conn.Gen.Stat 
52-278c(aXl), plaintiffs application for a 
>rejudgment attachment on the two proper-
ies was granted on the basis of a finding 
>f probable cause supporting the plaintiffs 
:laims. See Order (Jan. 6, 1989). Defen-
lant Lepore has now moved to vacate the 
ittachments on the grounds that there is 
'sufficient doubt" that plaintiffs will be 
ible to establish that the conveyance were 
nade with a fraudulent intent as required 
Dy Conn.Gen.Stat § 52-552. 
A prejudgment remedy may be obtained 
when the plaintiff establishes that there is 
probable cause to sustain the validity of his 
claims. The plaintiff need not demon-
strate, by a preponderance of evidence or 
otherwise, that he will prevail. Dow & 
Condon, Inc. v. Anderson, 203 Conn. 475, 
525 A.2d 935 (1987). Contrary to defen-
dant's assertions, the affidavit submitted in 
support of his motion does not cast "suffl-
7. Defendant Lepore is similarly not entitled to 
summary judgment at the present time. As the 
foregoing makes clear, there are still genuine 
issues of material fact regarding the nature and 
extent of Mr. Lepore's involvement in the part-
nership transactions. Until these are conclu-
de nt doubt1' on the validity of plaintiffs 
claims to impugn the prejudgment attach-
ment However, since a defendant will or-
dinarily move pursuant to Conn.Gen.Stat 
§ 52-278e for a hearing to vacate a pre-
judgment remedy, and since the defendant 
has called into question an affidavit sub-
mitted by plaintiffs in support of the at-
tachment, the pending motion should be 
denied without prejudice to the defendant's 
filing a timely motion for a hearing in strict 
accordance with the above-referenced stat-
ute. 
V. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the 
defendant's motion to dismiss or for sum-
mary judgment is denied in all respects. 
The motion to vacate the prejudgment at-
tachment is denied without prejudice to to 
the filing of a renewed motion to vacate 
and a request for a hearing as contem-
plated by Conn.Gen.Stat § 52-278e. 
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPO-
RATION; Long Island Lighting Com-
pany; New York State Electric & Gas 
Corporation; Rochester Gas and Elec-
tric Corporation; and Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corporation, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING 
CORPORATION, ITT Fluid Products 
Corporation, and ITT Fluid Technology 
Corporation, Defendants. 
No. 88-CV-819. 
United States District Court, 
N.D. New York. 
May 25, 1989. 
, Nuclear power plant owners brought 
action against construction manager and 
sively resolved, the court cannot find, as a mat-
ter of law, that the judgments at issue were 
placed on an unsound jurisdictional foundation. 
Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary 
judgment should also be denied. 
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER v. STONE & WEBSTER ENG. 
Cite M US FJLD. S7S (MJKN.Y. 19tf) 
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Held fabrication and piping contractors to 
recover for faulty design and construction 
of plant One owner and manager moved 
for protective orders, and contractors 
moved to compel production of documents. 
The District Court, McCurn, Chief Judge, 
held that (1) documents submitted in pro-
ceeding before New York Public Service 
Commission were work product; (2) owners 
waived work product protection as to some 
of those documents; and (3) manager was 
not entitled to depose owners' attorney. 
Motions granted in part and denied in 
part 
1. Federal Civil Procedure ^» 1600.2 
Protected work product contained in 
documents and tangible things cannot be 
obtained through less tangible methods 
such as deposition questioning of persons 
with knowledge of protected information. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26(bX3), 28 U.S.C. 
A. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure «= 1600.2 
Work product documents prepared for 
litigation in one action are protected from 
discovery in subsequent, related suit Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26(bX3), 28 U.S.C.A. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure «=»1600.2 
Nuclear power plant's construction 
manager that provided architectural and 
engineering services and consultants were 
"representatives" of owners of nuclear 
power plant within meaning of work prod-
uct rule; manager and consultants pre-
pared or reviewed documents at direction 
of owners or their attorneys in anticipation 
of litigation before New York Public Ser-
vice Commission. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 
26(bX3), 28 U.S.C.A. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Federal Civil Procedure «=M 600.2 
Documents prepared at direction of nu-
clear power plant owners or their attorneys 
in anticipation of litigation before New 
York Public Service Commission to deter-
mine prudence of costs for power plant 
were work product in suit by owners to 
recover for allegedly faulty design and con-
struction of plant by field fabrication and 
piping contractors and construction manag-
er which also served as architectural and 
engineering firm; suit by owners was 
closely related to prudence proceeding be-
fore Commission. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 
26(bX3), 28 U.S.C.A. 
5. Federal Civil Procedure *»1600.4 
Generally, work product protection is 
waived when documents are voluntarily 
shared with adversary or when party pos-
sessing documents seeks to selectively 
present materials to prove a point, but then 
attempts to invoke privilege to prevent op-
ponent from challenging assertion. Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26(bX3), 28 U.S.C.A. 
6. Federal Civil Procedure *= 1600.4 
Sharing work product material with 
friendly party does not waive work product 
protection as it applies to adverse third 
party. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26(bX3), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
7. Federal Civil Procedure *=»1600.4 
Protection of work product materials is 
not waived when disclosure occurs through 
excusable inadvertence. Fed.Rules Civ. 
ProcRule 26(bX3), 28 U.S.C.A. 
8. Federal Civil Procedure «=*1600.4 
Knowing release of privileged doc-
uments constitutes waiver of work product 
protection and is not inadvertent, while 
simple mistake that is immediately recog-
nized and rectified is not waiver of work 
product protection. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 
Rule 26(bX3), 28 U.S.C.A. 
9. Federal Civil Procedure *= 1600.4 
Generally, work product protection is 
waived when protected materials are dis-
closed in manner which is either inconsist-
ent with maintaining secrecy against oppo-
nents or substantially increases opportuni-
ty for potential adversary to obtain protect-
ed information. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 
26(bX3), 28 U.S.OA. 
10. Federal Civil Procedure «=M 600.4 
Owners of nuclear power plant in ac-
tion against construction manager and field 
fabrication and piping contractors to recov-
er for allegedly faulty design and construe-
so 125 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS 
>n waived work product protection with 
spect to "Product Management Book" 
hich was written by manager over course 
many years before New York Public 
jrvice Commission initiated proceeding to 
itermine prudence of costs of power 
ant; manager, which also served as archi-
ct and engineer, did not obtain possession 
r excusable inadvertence or compulsion; 
id owners were apparently cognizant of 
itential for adversary legal relationship 
ith manager and could have created 
took" without manager's assistance. 
jd.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26<bX3), 28 U.S. 
A. 
. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>1600.4 
Owners of nuclear power plant in ae-
ro against construction manager and field 
brication and piping contractors to recov-
for allegedly faulty design and eonstruc-
>n did not waive work product protection 
ith respect to draft answers to interroga-
tes by New York Public Service Commis-
on in proceeding to determine prudence of 
ant costs, even though answers were dis-
osed to manager; manager, that also was 
•chitect and engineer, was only party in 
>sition to verify factual assertions con-
fined in draft answers; and since owners 
id only 120 days to respond to interroga-
tes , there was de facto compulsion to 
sclose protected work product. Fed. 
ules Civ.Proc.Rule 26(b)(3), 28 U.S.C.A. 
I. Federal Civil Procedure «= 1600.4 
Owners of nuclear power plant in ae-
on against construction manager and field 
ibrication and piping contractors to recov-
r for allegedly faulty design and construe-
on waived work product protection with 
aspect to consultant reports which were 
isclosed to manager to be reviewed for 
ictual accuracy and style before submis-
ion to New York Public Service Commis-
ion in proceeding to determine prudence of 
lant costs; Commission did not require 
sports; reports were disclosed to manager 
rhen one owner's president had serious 
oubts as to performance by manager, 
fhich also served as architect and engi-
eer; and owners could have requested 
lanager to verify factual assertions while 
eeping reports themselves confidential. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26(b)(3), 28 U.S. 
C.A. 
13. Federal Civil Procedure «=> 1600.4 
Field fabrication and piping contrac-
tors in action by nuclear power plant own-
ers to recover for allegedly faulty design 
and construction by construction manager 
and contractors were entitled to discover 
owners' documents which lost work prod-
uct protection after owners waived it with 
respect to manager; equal access of man-
ager and contractors to documents was 
necessary to place all parties on equal foot-
ing. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26(b)(3), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
14. Federal Civil Procedure <3= 1600.2 
Field fabrication and piping contrac-
tors in action by nuclear power plant own-
ers to recover for allegedly faulty design 
and construction by architect and engineer-
ing firm and contractors would be unable 
without undue hardship to reconstruct 
"Project Management Book," which was 
work product prepared for proceeding be-
fore New York Public Service Commission 
and, therefore, were entitled to discover 
"Book"; "Book" took years to compile and 
involved millions of documents. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 26(b)(3), 28 U.S.C.A. 
15. Federal Civil Procedure «=»1415 
Construction manager in action by nu-
clear power plant owners to recover for 
allegedly faulty design and construction 
was not entitled to depose owners' attorney 
who also represented them in proceeding 
before New York Public Service Commis-
sion to determine prudence of plant costs; 
deposition would increase likelihood of at-
torney being called as witness; deposition 
had potential for invasion of privileged or 
protected material; and information sought 
by manager could be obtained through in-
terrogatories or by deposition of owners. 
Fed.Rules Civ.ProcRules 26(b)(3), 26(c), 
30(b)(6), 37(a), 28 U.S.C.A. 
Hiscock & Barclay, Syracuse, N.Y., Swi-
dler & Berlin, Washington, D.C., for plain-
tiff Niagara Mohawk Power; Richard K. 
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER T. STONE & WEBSTER ENG. 581 
Cite • • 125 FJU>. S7t (N.D.N.Y. 198t) 
Hughes, Syracuse, N.Y., John R. Ferguson, 
Washington, D.C., of counsel. 
Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, 111., Hancock 
& Estabrook, Syracuse, N.Y., for plaintiffs 
Long Island Lighting, New York State 
Electric & Gas, Rochester Gas & Electric 
and Central Hudson Gas & Electric; G. 
Christian Kronberg, Chicago, III., Donald J. 
Kemple, Syracuse, N.Y., of counsel. 
Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Fer-
don, New York City, Costello Cooney & 
Fearon, Syracuse, N.Y., for defendant 
Stone & Webster Engineering; Harold G. 
Levison, New York City, Vincent O'Neil, 
Syracuse, N.Y., of counsel. 
McNamee Lochner Titus & Williams, At-
torneys for Defendants ITT Fluid Products 
& ITT Fluid Technology, Albany, N.Y., 
Pepper Hamilton & Scheetz, Philadelphia, 
Pa., for defendants ITT Fluid Products & 
ITT Fluid Technology; Scott A. Barbour, 
Albany, N.Y., of counsel. 
MEMORANDUM-DECISION 
AND ORDER 
McCURN, Chief Judge. 
/. Overview 
The plaintiffs are five utilities who own, 
operate, and are tenants in common (to-
gether "the Cotenants") of the Nine Mile 
Point 2 nuclear power plant in Scriba, New 
York. The Niagara Mohawk Power Corpo-
ration, ("Niagara Mohawk") as the manag-
ing cotenant, has been the primary actor in 
coordinating efforts to develop the nuclear 
facility. The four other utilities, namely 
the Long Island Lighting Company, the 
New York State Electric & Gas Corpora-
tion, the Rochester Gas and Electric Corpo-
ration, and the Central Hudson Gas & Elec-
tric Corporation, played some lesser role in 
bringing Nine Mile Point 2 ("NMP2") to 
completion. The plaintiffs have brought 
this action against Stone & Webster Engi-
neering Corporation ("SWEC"), ITT Fluid 
Products Corporation, and ITT Fluid Tech-
nology Corporation (collectively "ITT') for 
damages which allegedly resulted from the 
faulty design and construction of the Nine 
Mile Point 2 plant 
There are currently a number of motions 
pending before this court This memoran-
dum decision and order addresses the fol-
lowing: (1) the motion by plaintiff Niagara 
Mohawk for a protective order, pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), to prevent the deposi-
tion by SWEC of attorney Steven J. Agres-
ta; (2) the motion by defendant SWEC for 
a protective order, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. 
P. 37(a), compelling William J. Donlon to 
answer certain deposition questions; (3) the 
cross motion by the plaintiffs, under Rule 
26(c), for a protective order precluding the 
defendants use and/or retention of certain 
documents, and (4) the motion by ITT to 
compel the production of certain documents 
pursuant to Rule 37(a) Fed.R-Civ.P. 
//. Background 
In June of 1971 Stone & Webster Engi-
neering Corporation was retained by the 
Cotenants as the architect/engineer and 
construction manager for a nuclear power 
plant planned to be built in upstate New 
York. The Nine Mile Point 2 nuclear pow-
er plant was to be owned by Niagara Mo-
hawk and four other utilities. Construc-
tion commenced on the 1080 megawatt nu-
clear facility in 1975, the nuclear fuel was 
loaded in 1986, and NMP2 went into com-
mercial operation in 1988. The plaintiffs 
hired ITT Grinnell Corporation in 1974 to 
perform field fabrication and erection of 
the piping at the,nuclear facility. ITT 
Grinnell's alleged successors in business, 
and the defendants in this suit, are ITT 
Fluid Products Corporation and ITT Fluid 
Technology Corporation (hereafter "ITT"). 
On April 16, 1982, the New York Public 
Service Commission (the "PSC") issued a 
decision stating that its future policy would 
be to permit Niagara Mohawk and the Co-
tenants to recoup only those investments in 
NMP2 that were made prudently. There-
after, Niagara Mohawk and the Cotenants 
retained Steven Agresta, a partner in the 
law firm of Swidler & Berlin, to represent 
it in an anticipated administrative proceed-
ing before the PSC in which a determina-
tion would be made as to which of the 
capital costs of NMP2 were prudently in-
curred. This "prudence proceeding" would 
be of prime importance to the investor 
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owned utilities who were then in the pro-
cess of constructing the Nine Mile Point 2 
facility. Under the PSC's regulatory 
scheme, investor owned utilities are only 
allowed to earn a profit and recoup costs 
on monetary disbursements which are 
"prudent" Any non-prudent costs must be 
borne by the utilities' shareholders rather 
than the customers. Moreover, the utilities 
bear the burden of proving the propriety of 
their capital investments. See generally, 
N.Y.P.S.C. Case 29124, Proceeding on the 
Motion of the Commission to Investigate 
the Prudence of Costs Incurred for the 
Construction of the Nine Mile Point $ 
Nuclear Generating Facility, (July 3, 
1985). 
The PSC initiated a prudence proceeding 
into the costs of NMP2 on July 3, 1985. 
Attached to the PSC's order were a number 
of interrogatories to which the utilities 
were required to respond within 120 days. 
The PSC staff and the utilities never actu-
ally litigated the matter before the Com-
mission. Rather, on the 18th of Septem-
ber, 1985, the staff of the Public Service 
Commission and the Cotenants filed a joint 
motion proposing a settlement as to the 
amount of capital investment in NMP2 
which would be deemed to have been pru-
dently incurred. 
Between November of 1985 and January 
of 1986 the Public Service Commission con-
ducted evidentiary hearings on the pro-
posed settlement During these proceed-
ings the Cotenants submitted testimony, 
discovery responses, and legal briefs. The 
PSC adopted a settlement on October 3, 
1986, by which the utilities were permitted 
to place $4.16 billion of the costs of NMP2 
into the rate base. According to the utili-
ties this amounted to a disallowance of 
over $2 billion. The settlement is now on 
appeal to the Appellate Division of the New 
York State Supreme Court, preserving the 
possibility of remand to the PSC for a full 
prudence proceeding. 
A key concern of the parties herein is the 
extent to which documents prepared in an-
ticipation of the PSC prudence proceeding 
are subject to discovery in this action. 
Many of the "prudence documents" are 
already possessed by defendant SWEC. In 
fact, SWEC, as the architect/engineer and 
construction manager of NMP2, was in 
possession of much of the factual informa-
tion necessary to respond to the PSC pru-
dence investigation. SWEC also partici-
pated in drafting substantial portions of 
these prudence documents. However, the 
ITT defendants did not assist in the draft-
ing of any of these materials and currently 
possess only a limited number of same. 
The Prudence Documents 
A. The Project Management Book 
In April of 1983, well before the PSC 
initiated the NMP2 prudence proceeding, 
the Co-tenants, Swidler & Berlin, and 
SWEC combined efforts to create doc-
uments which attempted to set forth facts 
and circumstances substantiating the costs 
of the Nine Mile Point 2 facility. This 
document, termed the "Project Manage-
ment Book", was to detail numerous as-
pects of the design and construction of 
NMP2 including: an overall description of 
the role of upper management; engineer-
ing and design; quality assurance; quality 
control; procurement; contract administra-
tion; document control; cost estimating 
and forecasting; construction manage-
ment; the start-up process; testing, and 
planning. The Project Management Book 
(the "P.M. Book") was created to assist the 
utilities in responding to any questions 
posed by the PSC as part of the prudence 
inquiry as well as in the affirmative asser-
tion of their case before the Commission. 
The P.M. Book was initiated by an April 
1983 letter from Mr. William Donlon, the 
President of Niagara Mohawk, to Mr. 
Frank Reis, then President of SWEC, relay-
ing the Co-tenants' plans to assemble infor-
mation in anticipation of the PSC prudence 
investigation. That letter stated in part 
We believe that the best way to doc-
ument the prudent management of the 
project is to develop a book which would 
be a detailed history of the project 
management of NMP2. Such a book 
would describe, among other things, how 
engineering drawings were produced and 
processed, the methods for developing 
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER v. STONE & WEBSTER ENG. 
OUM125 FJLD. S7S (NJ>J«.Y. !*•#) 583 
and revising cost estimates, the project's 
quality assurance and control programs 
and the supervision of contractors at the 
site. This project management book 
would not be an evaluation of manage-
ment practices of Stone & Webster or 
the cotenants. Rather, it would be a 
detailed description of how the manage-
ment structure evolved over time. It is 
our belief that a document neutral in 
tone and descriptive in nature would be 
the most persuasive approach to showing 
effective project managements 
In the additional role of what Niagara Mo-
hawk has termed a "paid litigation consul-
tant", SWEC was to assist the utilities and 
Swidler & Berlin in developing a history of 
the operation of NMP2 which would help to 
demonstrate to the PSC that the facility 
was properly managed and its costs pru-
dently incurred. SWEC was advised that 
Mr. Agresta was to direct this effort on 
behalf of Niagara Mohawk and the Co-ten-
ants. For its part, SWEC appointed Harry 
Reese, a former project manager at NMP2, 
to head SWEC's fact finding team and co-
ordinate efforts with the Swidler & Berlin 
firm. 
The P.M. Book, according to SWEC, was 
developed over the course of 18 months 
and was substantially completed in 1984. 
Niagara Mohawk, however, contends that 
this document was never actually complet-
ed. In any event, the documents which 
comprise the P.M. Book are extensive. The 
P.M. Book was created through a process 
whereby the SWEC team drafted and re-
drafted portions of the book in accordance 
with a detailed outline and subsequent edi-
torial comments provided by Swidler & 
Berlin. 
B. The Draft Responses 
On July 3, 1985, the PSC commenced its 
investigation into the management and 
costs of Nine Mile 2. As part of its investi-
gation the PSC served hundreds of inter-
rogatories on the utilities who own NMP2 
requesting information concerning the nu-
clear plant The PSC ordered the utilities 
to respond within 120 days. Mr. Agresta 
and his law firm were charged by the utili-
ties with drafting responses to the inter-
rogatories. According to the October 10, 
1988, declaration of Mr. Agresta, the per-
sons who actually drafted the answers to 
the PSC's questions were Thomas Lemberg 
and other attorneys at the Swidler & Berlin 
firm. Steven Agresta, who has been re-
tained by Niagara Mohawk as a trial coun-
sel in this action, asserts that he did not 
author or assist in the selection of doc-
uments for any of the draft responses. 
On July 24, 1985, Mr. Agresta sent draft 
responses to PSC interrogatories # 2 and 
# 8 to Harry Reese for SWEC's comments. 
It is the plaintiffs' position that they had to 
send these draft responses to SWEC so 
that they could be reviewed for accuracy 
before submission to the PSC. SWEC 
claims to have also received a revised draft 
of answers to certain unspecified interroga-
tories from Swidler & Berlin on September 
27, 1985. 
The interrogatories required an extensive 
response. Question # 2 of Appendix A 
stated in part 
For each major management area— 
project management, construction, engi-
neering, licensing and regulatory affairs, 
and quality assurance/quality control— 
the co-tenants shall provide a written de-
scription of the methodologies or pro-
grams employed by the project in ad-
dressing the following managerial func-
tions . . . 
Question 8 of Appendix A -stated in part 
The co-tenants shall explain what tech-
niques were used to measure the per-
formance of project management and to 
control capital program costs . . . 
SWEC retained a copy of the draft respons-
es to these questions. These particular 
draft responses were never filed by the 
utilities with the PSC as part of the pru-
dence proceedings. Rather, the parties 
moved to settlement negotiations before 
any response was required to be formally 
submitted. However, the plaintiffs were 
required to make other submissions to the 
PSC as part of the process whereby the 
PSC determined whether to adopt the pro-
posed settlement; these documents are on 
public record. 
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Other Prudence Documents 
Defendant ITT was not involved in the 
velopment of the prudence documents 
d requests that it be permitted additional 
scovery to that discussed above. This 
[>uld include all correspondence and other 
euments transmitted between Niagara 
ohawk, the Co-tenants, and Swidler & 
srlin to and from SWEC which were con-
rned with issues relevant to the present 
tion, as well as reports prepared by the 
^tenants' consultants in preparation for 
e prudence proceeding which were turned 
rer to SWEC. It appears that consultant 
ports were prepared by Cresap, McCor-
ick & Paget, Bechtel Corporation, and 
>rrey Pines Technology Inc. 
On November 7, 1988, ITT served a de-
and upon the plaintiffs for the production 
" documents. On December 12, 1988, the 
laintiffs served their response to this doc-
ment demand objecting to the first 22 of 
I numbered requests as demanding infor-
lation covered by the attorney/client privi-
ge or protected under the attorney work 
roduct doctrine. Currently, however, ITT 
> in possession of a number of the these 
ocuments which were provided either as 
xhibits to motion papers or given to ITT 
y SWEC at the deposition of Mr. William 
•onion. 
SWEC cites the following as documents 
rhich it was requested to prepare or com-
lent upon in the course of preparing for 
le prudence proceeding. 
1. July 1985 draft report on manage-
ment of NMP2 prepared for the New 
York Public Service Commission. 
2. September 1985 draft report on 
management of NMP2 prepared for the 
New York Public Service Commission. 
3. September 1985 draft report on the 
Primary Containment Liner prepared for 
the New York State Public Service Com-
mission. 
4. September 1985 draft report on the 
1974-75 slowdown prepared for the New 
York State Public Service Commission. 
5. September 1985 draft report on geol-
ogy prepared for the New York State 
Public Service Commission. 
6. September 1985 draft response to 
Appendix B to the New York State Pub-
lic Service Commission order instituting 
the NMP2 prudence proceeding. 
7. Testimony of Messrs. Rinalli, Terry 
& Goyal dated October 30, 1985, in the 
New York Public Service Commission 
Case No. 29124 particularly concerning 
the 41 "enhancements" at NMP2. 
8. The Cresap, McCormick & Paget re-
port entitled "Swidler, Berlin & Strelow 
Step V—Assessment of Stone & Webster 
project Management, November 1984, 
Volumes I and II, including Swidler & 
Berlin's comments on the report" 
These are the types of documents which 
ITT is apparently seeking to obtain 
through discovery. 
D. The Donlon Deposition 
SWEC deposed William Donlon, Chair-
man of the Board and Chief Executive Offi-
cer of Niagara Mohawk, on November 9, 
10, 30, and December 1, 1988. At the 
deposition the plaintiffs' counsel contested 
the propriety of questions regarding state-
ments contained in certain prudence doc-
uments, instructing his client not to re-
spond. ITT was represented by counsel at 
this deposition. During the course of the 
deposition attorneys for SWEC marked as 
exhibits a number of the prudence doc-
uments and turned them over to ITT. 
The Present Proceedings and Motion 
On August 1, 1988, Niagara Mohawk and 
the Co-tenants filed a complaint against 
SWEC and the ITT defendants for dam-
ages arising out of the design, engineering, 
and construction of NMP2. Through 
claims sounding in both contract and tort, 
the plaintiffs seek to recover excess costs 
associated with the defendants work in 
such areas as overhead, overtime, delay in 
project completion, redesign, reconstruc-
tion, and other alleged mismanagement 
SWEC served an answer on August 30th 
along with a notice to depose Steven Agres-
ta, plaintiffs' counsel in the prudence pro-
ceeding, William Donlon, Chief Executive 
Officer of Niagara Mohawk, and Paul 
Briggs, Chief Executive Officer of Roch-
ester Gas and Electric Corporation. 
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A central issue presented by these mo-
tions is whether the prudence documents 
are subject to discovery. The Cotenants 
contend that all of the documents are pro-
tected work product since they were pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation. Plain-
tiffs request that the defendants be prohib-
ited from retaining or using any of the 
prudence documents along with any notes 
which were made from these documents. 
Niagara Mohawk asserts that the only rele-
vant information Mr. Agresta could provide 
is either privileged or protected "from dis-
closure. On this basis Niagara Mohawk 
seeks to have the deposition of Mr. Agresta 
precluded, under Rule 26(c), or stayed 
pending defendants' attempts to secure the 
same information through other discovery 
methods. Plaintiffs also seek a protective 
order barring the deposition questioning of 
William J. Donlon concerning documents 
drafted in anticipation of the PSC prudence 
proceeding. 
SWEC and ITT assert that the attorney 
work product protection does not apply to 
the prudence documents or, in the alterna-
tive, that any protection as to these doc-
uments was waived. Moreover, SWEC 
maintains that the deposition of Steven 
Agresta should be permitted. SWEC 
states that it does not intend to question 
Mr. Agresta about his legal thoughts or 
conclusions as to the prudence documents. 
Rather, SWEC will question Agresta about 
the sources of his facts: the persons and 
documentary sources of information that 
he relied upon to create both the draft 
responses to the PSC's interrogatories and 
the Project Management Book. Finally, 
SWEC asserts that Mr. Donlon should be 
1. As stated in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 VS. 495. 
67 S.Ct. 385, 392. 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947); 
"[T]he deposition-discovery rules are to be ac-
corded a broad and liberal treatment. No long-
er can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedi-
tion" serve to preclude a party from inquiring 
into the facts underlying his opponent's case. 
Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gath-
ered by both parties is essential to proper litiga-
tion. To that end, either party may compel the 
other to disgorge what ever facts he has in his 
possession." 
2. Fed.RXiv.P. 26(b)(1) states in applicable part: 
"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any 
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the 
compelled to answer deposition questions 
concerning the prudence documents as they 
are fair ground for discovery. 
///. Discussion 
A. Discovery of Prudence Documents 
The scope of discovery under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure is broad.1 The 
Rules open to inquiry not only matters 
which may be relevant to the subject mat-
ter of the suit but matters which appear 
"reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence." * From a 
review of the complaint in this action it 
cannot be disputed that the information 
sought by ITT and the information sought 
to be retained by SWEC is relevant for the 
purposes of discovery under the Federal 
Rules. 
"In Hickman v. Taylor, . . . the Court 
recognized a qualified immunity from dis-
covery for the 'work product of the law-
yer'; such material could only be discover-
ed upon a substantial showing of 'necessity 
or justification.'" F.T.C. v. Grolier Inc.t 
462 U.S. 19, 103 S.Ct 2209, 2212, 76 L.Ed. 
2d 387 (1983). The holding of Hickman 
has largely been embodied in Fed.R.Civ.P. 
26(bX3) which outlines "the extent to which 
trial preparation materials are discoverable 
in federal court" Id 103 S.Ct at 213. 
Rule 26(b)(3) provides in pertinent part 
a party may obtain discovery of doc-
uments and tangible things prepared 
in anticipation of litigation or for trial by 
or for another party or by or for that 
other party's representative (including 
the other party's attorney, consultant, 
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) 
only upon a showing that the party seek-
subject matter involved in the pending action, 
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the 
party seeking discovery or to the claim or de-
fense of any other party, including the exist-
ence, description, nature, custody, condition 
and location of any books, documents, or other 
tangible things and the identity and location of 
persons having knowledge of any discoverable 
matter. It is not ground for objection that the 
information sought will be inadmissible at the 
trial if the information sought appears reason-
ably calculated to lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence." 
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ing discovery has substantial need of the 
materials in the preparation of his case 
and that the party is unable without un-
due hardship to obtain the substantial 
equivalent of the materials by other 
means. In ordering discovery of such 
materials when the required showing has 
been made, the court shall protect 
against disclosure of the mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theo-
ries of an attorney or other representa-
tive of a party concerning the litigation. 
In other words, "three conditions must be 
met to earn work product protection. The 
material must (1) be a document or tangible 
thing, (2) that was prepared in anticipation 
of litigation, and (3) was prepared by or for 
a party, or by or for his representative." 
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Dee. 
18, 1981, etc, 561 F.Supp. 1247, 1257 (E.D. 
N.Y.1982). "Once these conditions are sat-
isfied, the party seeking discovery must 
establish a substantial need for the materi-
al and a practical inability to secure the 
substantial equivalent thereof by alternate 
means." Id. 
[1] In ordering discovery, after the re-
quired showing has been made by the party 
seeking discovery, the court "shall protect 
against disclosure of the mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions or legal theo-
ries" contained within these documents. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(bX3). It is a necessary cor-
ollary that protected work product con-
tained in documents and tangible things 
cannot be obtained through less tangible 
methods such as the deposition questioning 
of persons with knowledge of the protected 
information. See Hickman, 67 S.Ct at 
393-94.* 
3. As stated in Hickman 67 S.CL at 393: 
I n our opinion, neither Rule 26 nor any other 
rule dealing with discovery contemplates pro-
duction under such circumstances. That is not 
because the subject matter is privileged or irrel-
evant, as those concepts are used in these rules. 
Here is simply an attempt, without purported 
necessity or justification, to secure written state* 
merits, private memoranda and personal recol-
lections prepared or formed by an adverse par-
ty's counsel in the course of his legal duties. As 
such, it falls outside the arena of discovery and 
contravenes the public policy underlying the 
orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims. 
[2] The work product doctrine has been 
held to protect documents prepared in an-
ticipation of an administrative proceeding 
such as the Public Service Commission's 
prudence proceeding. Sprague v. Director 
of Office of Worker's Compensation, 688 
F.2d 862, 869-70 and n. 16 (1st Cir.1982). 
Rule 26(bX3) also applies to protect work 
product materials "prepared for a party's 
representative, such as an attorney." Id. 
at 870. However, the definition of the 
term "representative" in Rule 26(bX3) goes 
beyond attorney work product and includes 
the work product prepared on an attorney's 
behalf. As recited in Sprague: 
[T]he Supreme Court noted in United 
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct 
2160, [45 L.Ed.2d 141] (1976), [that] the 
work-product doctrine must "necessar-
ily" apply to materials prepared on an 
attorney's behalf, id. [422 U.S.] at 239 n. 
13, 95 S.CL at 2170 n. 13, because an 
attorney must often rely on the assist-
ance of others "in the compilation of 
materials in the preparation for trial." 
Id. at 238, 95 S.Ct at 2170. 'This view," 
the Court stated, "is reflected in the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, see Rule 
26(bX3)...." Id. at 239 n. 13, 95 S.Ct at 
2170 n. 13. 
688 F.2d at 870. Moreover, work-product 
documents prepared for litigation in one 
action are protected from discovery in a 
subsequent related suit Fed.R.Civ.P. 
26(bX3) "protects materials prepared for 
any litigation or trial as long as they were 
prepared by or for a party to the subse-
quent litigation." F.T.C. v. Grolier Inc., 
103 S.Ct at 2213. 
[3,4] Many of the prudence documents 
were prepared or reviewed by SWEC at the 
Not even the most liberal of discovery theories 
can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files 
and the mental impressions of an attorney 
Proper preparation of a client's case demands 
that he assemble information, sift what he con-
siders to be relevant from the irrelevant facts, 
prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy 
without undue and needless interference 
This work is reflected, of course, in interviews, 
statements. memoranda. correspondence, 
briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and 
countless other tangible and intangible ways— 
aptly though roughly termed .. . as the work 
product of the lawyer.1* 
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direction of the plaintiffs or their attorneys 
and in anticipation of litigation before the 
PSC. The same is true for the outside 
consultant's reports on NMP2. Thus, 
SWEC and the consultants were acting as 
"representatives" of the plaintiffs within 
the meaning of Rule 26(b)(3). Therefore, 
the prudence documents were protected 
work product for purposes of the PSC's 
prudence proceeding. The present action is 
closely related to the prudence proceeding 
initiated before the PSC. Thus, the pru-
dence documents qualify as protected work 
product materials for purposes of this liti-
gation. The issue therefore is whether the 
work product protection was waived as to 
the prudence documents which were turned 
over to SWEC. 
[5,6] Generally, the work product pro-
tection is waived when documents are vol-
untarily shared with an adversary or when 
a party possessing the documents seeks to 
selectively present the materials to prove a 
point, but then attempts to invoke the privi-
lege to prevent an opponent from challeng-
ing the assertion. United States v. Nobles, 
422 U.S. 225, 239-40, 95 S.Ct 2160, 2170-
71, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). Moreover, work 
product protection is waived when protect-
ed materials are disclosed in a manner 
which "substantially increases the opportu-
nity for potential adversaries to obtain the 
information." In re Grand Jury Subpoe-
nas Dated December 18, 1981 and Janu-
ary 4, 1982, 561 RSupp. 1247,1257 (E.D.N. 
Y.1982); see GAF Corp. v. Eastman Ko-
dak Co., 85 F.R.D. 46, 51-52 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979); 8 Wright and Miller, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure § 2024 at 209-210 
(1970). However, sharing work product 
material with a friendly party does not 
waive the work product protection as it 
applies to an adverse third party. United 
States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 
295-96 (Temp.Emer.CtApp.1985); Western 
Fuels Ass'n v. Burlington Northern R. 
Co., 102 F.R.D. 201, 203 (D.Wyo.1984). As 
explained in United States v. Gulf Oil 
Corp., 
[T]he work product privilege does not 
exist to protect a confidential relation-
ship, but rather to promote the adversary 
system by safeguarding the fruits of an 
attorney's trial preparations from the 
discovery attempts of the opponent The 
purpose of the work product doctrine is 
to protect information against opposing 
parties, rather than against all others 
outside a particular confidential relation-
ship, in order to encourage effective trial 
preparation A disclosure made in 
the pursuit of such trial preparation, 
and not inconsistent with maintaining 
secrecy against opponents, should be 
allowed without waiver of the privilege. 
760 F.2d at 295 (emphasis added) (quoting 
United States v. American Tel and Tel 
Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C.Cir.1980)). 
The work product protection is afforded a 
far broader scope than the attorney/client 
privilege, the latter being waived when the 
privileged information is disclosed to any-
one, be they friend, foe, or merely neutral, 
who is outside of the confidence of the 
attorney client relationship. See In re 
Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 80-82 (2nd Cir.1973) 
(Friendly J.); United States v. Gulf Oil 
Corp., 760 F.2d at 295; Matter of Grand 
Jury Subpoena, Etc., Nov. IS 1974, 406 
F.Supp. 381, 386-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
However, courts have been willing to 
preserve the work product protection over 
documents in circumstances where the dis-
closure to a potential adversary was com-
pelled. In Transamerica Computer Co. 
Inc. v. International Business Afachinei 
Corp., 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir.1978), a court 
in a prior unrelated lawsuit had ordered 
expedited production of some 17 millioi 
documents by I.B.M. over a three montl 
period. Though I.B.M. made great effort 
to maintain the privilege as to certain o: 
these documents, a number of them wen 
still disclosed. In the Transamerica case 
the plaintiffs sought to make use of th< 
privileged documents disclosed in the previ 
ous litigation in its case against I.B.M 
The court upheld I.B.M.'s assertion that th 
documents were protected, finding tha 
there had been a "de facto compulsion" du 
to "the imposition of an extremely rigorou 
schedule for discovery." Id. at 651. 
In Simpson v. Braider, 104 F.R.D. 515 
522-23 (D.D.C.1985), the court held that th 
production of privileged information by 
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lefendant in a criminal prosecution, that 
nformation being necessary to the defen-
lant's assertion of mitigating circumstanc-
es in connection with sentencing, could not 
>e considered a voluntary disclosure, 
rherefore, the documents retained their 
privileged status in a subsequent litigation. 
rd. at 522. In holding the information pro-
jected, the court noted the general reluc-
ance "to find a waiver of a privilege when 
protected material] is involuntarily given 
tuch as pursuant to a subpoena, or to de-
fend against criminal charges or under cir-
cumstances indicating there was realistical-
y no voluntary disclosure." Id. at 523. 
rhough the court made this general state-
ment with regard to the waiver of the 
attorney/client privilege, it applies equally 
to the work product privilege, the work 
product protection being broader in scope 
than the attorney /client privilege. United 
States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 P.2d at 295. 
[7,8] Moreover, the protection afforded 
work product materials is not waived when 
disclosure occurs through excusable inad-
vertence. United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 
1411, 1417 (9th Cir.1987), cert granted on 
other grounds, — U.S. , 109 S.Ct 
257, 102 L.Ed.2d 246 (1988). The Zolin 
court, for example, found that no waiver 
had taken place with regard to tapes 
turned over to an adversary by a secretary 
who was under the mistaken impression 
that they were blank. Id. The knowing 
release of otherwise privileged documents 
constitutes a waiver and is not inadvertent, 
while a simple mistake, "immediately rec-
ognized and rectified" is not a waiver of 
the work product protection. See Lois 
Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & 
Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105-06 (S.D.N.Y.1985) 
(protected documents inadvertently produc-
ed in the course of large scale discovery did 
not lose protected status). 
Plaintiff's Position 
The Cotenants have moved for the entry 
of a protective order to preclude defen-
dants' use and retention of the prudence 
documents. Plaintiffs claim that they did 
not waive the work product protection be-
cause (1) SWEC was a consultant at the 
time of any disclosure and (2) that any 
disclosure to SWEC was compelled. The 
Cotenants assert that throughout their re-
lationship with SWEC they never intended 
to waive the work product protection over 
the prudence documents, noting that al-
most all of the documents which were 
transmitted between plaintiffs and SWEC 
were marked "Attorney Work Product 
Privileged and Confidential" 
Plaintiffs characterize SWEC's role as 
that of a "litigation consultant," as well as 
the architect/engineer and construction 
manager of the NMP2 project They main-
tain, that since the complaint raises no 
claims against SWEC with respect to work 
performed as litigation consultants, the 
documents written or reviewed by SWEC 
are not needed for their defense. It is 
asserted that the consultant/ client relation-
ship between plaintiffs and SWEC is analo-
gous to one in which an attorney is sued by 
a client for injuries suffered when hit by a 
car driven by the attorney. Plaintiffs con-
tend that, as the attorney could not then 
disclose client confidences obtained while 
previously defending the client in a divorce 
action, see U.S. v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287, 
292 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1109, 
106 S.Ct 1518, 89 L.Ed.2d 916 (1986), 
SWEC must maintain the confidential rela-
tionship in this suit 
Plaintiffs contend that the practical cir-
cumstances surrounding the preparation of 
materials for the prudence proceeding com-
pelled them to transfer prudence doc-
uments to SWEC for review. In the pru-
dence proceeding the Cotenants were re-
quired to justify the costs incurred in the 
construction of NMP2. Failure to do so 
would result in the costs being disallowed. 
Since SWEC was in control of the vast 
majority of information needed to make 
plaintiffs' case and because billions of dol-
lars were at stake, plaintiffs claim that 
they were required to employ SWEC to 
prepare for the proceeding. According to 
the Cotenants, SWEC was the only party in 
a position to verify facts contained in the 
prudence documents. Moreover, because 
the draft answers to interrogatories were 
required to be submitted to the PSC, 
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SWEC's verification of the documents was 
needed to avoid committing perjury. 
The Cotenants argue that utilities should 
not be placed in a position where they have 
to choose between protecting their rights in 
a prudence proceeding and protecting their 
rights as against the construction manager 
of a project It is asserted that neither 
SWEC nor ITT have shown a substantial 
need for the prudence documents, that the 
defendants are the ones in possession of 
the vast majority of the facts, and. that the 
plaintiffs have filed with the PSC, and 
made part of the public record, the pru-
dence material that was actually adopted 
by the plaintiffs in the course of reaching a 
settlement with the PSC. The Cotenants 
assert that defendants can fulfill their dis-
covery requirements without the prudence 
documents. 
Plaintiffs argue that the prudence doc-
uments represent the tentative testing of 
advocacy positions against the facts of the 
case and therefore should not be subject to 
use by the opposing parties. The use of 
lawyer drafts, according to plaintiffs, ulti-
mately interferes with the plaintiffs' right 
to effective assistance of counsel. 
Defendants' Position 
While not conceding that the prudence 
documents constitute work product, defen-
dants focus their argument on the question 
of waiver. It is asserted that any protec-
tion which may have once attached to the 
documents was waived because plaintiffs 
(1) brought suit against SWEC (2) the suit 
concerned the same subject matter as the 
prudence documents and (3) the prudence 
documents had been freely transferred to 
SWEC. Moreover, defendants assert that 
plaintiffs admitted in their motion papers 
concerning the deposition of Steven Agres-
ta that they had waived the work product 
protection as it related to the prudence 
documents. 
SWEC and ITT contend that the pru-
dence documents are particularly relevant 
because statements contained therein are 
inconsistent with the allegations made in 
the complaint, and thus, may constitute 
admissions under Rule 801(d)(2) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. Under this theory 
it is necessary to inquire into the basis of 
the statements, the process used, and doc-
uments relied upon when writing the pru-
dence documents so that defendants can 
determine (1) whether or not the state-
ments will be admissible and (2) if admissi-
ble what evidence will be brought out by 
the plaintiffs to impeach or temper the 
damaging admissions. 
Defendants maintain that the Cotenants 
were not compelled to employ SWEC when 
preparing documents for the prudence pro-
ceeding; rather, SWEC could have been 
requested to provide strictly factual infor-
mation to the plaintiffs' litigation team, 
that team then proceeding in a completely 
confidential manner. Thus, according to 
defendants, the transfer of the prudence 
documents to SWEC was neither inadver-
tent nor compelled. SWEC notes that the 
plaintiffs spent many years preparing for 
the prudence proceeding. Under such cir-
cumstances there was no time pressure 
requiring plaintiffs to either use SWEC or 
go without a thorough defense. SWEC 
claims that an appropriate analogy to this 
case is the attorney malpractice action in 
which an attorney may disclose otherwise 
privileged communications to defend him-
self against charges of improper conduct 
without violating the attorney client privi-
lege. See e.g. U.S. v. Ballard, 779 F.2d at 
291-92. 
SWEC and ITT claim that the subject 
matter of the prudence documents involves 
the same matters which are at issue'in this 
suit—the design and construction of the 
NMP2 project The work product protec-
tion is waived when the documents are 
disclosed to a person in a manner which 
substantially increases the likelihood that 
they will be obtained by an opponent See 
e.g. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 561 
F.Supp. 1247, 1257 (E.D.N.Y.1982). Defen-
dants assert that plaintiffs knew SWEC 
was a potential legal adversary at the time 
the prudence documents were disclosed. 
SWEC cites the transcript of the Donlon 
deposition at pages 299 and 313 to support 
this position. Though, Mr. Donlon, the 
President and Chief Executive Officer of 
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Niagara Mohawk, did not state that plain-
tiffs were contemplating a lawsuit against 
SWEC, he did state that he was very dis-
appointed with SWEC's performance as far 
back as 1980. SWEC argues that such 
disappointment reveals that there was a 
potential for an adversary relationship of 
which the plaintiffs were aware at the time 
the prudence documents were disclosed to 
SWEC. By proceeding to disclose the doc-
uments in the face of the potential dispute, 
plaintiffs allegedly waived the privilege. 
Waiver of Work Product Protection 
The parties do not draw distinctions be-
tween the prudence documents; the plain-
tiffs request a protective order covering all 
such materials while defendants argue for 
full disclosure. There are, however, signif-
icant differences between the documents 
which bear on the issue of whether a waiv-
er has occurred. As noted above, the pru-
dence documents fall into three general 
categories: the Project Management Book, 
the draft answers to the PSC's interrogato-
ries, and the consultant reports. 
[9] This court has determined as a 
threshold matter that the prudence doc-
uments which were transferred to SWEC 
constitute work product under Rule 26(bX3) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The issue, therefore, is whether the plain-
tiffs waived the work product protection. 
Generally, the work product protection is 
waived when protected materials are dis-
closed in a manner which is either incon-
sistent with maintaining secrecy against 
opponents or substantially increases the op-
portunity for a potential adversary to ob-
tain the protected information. See United 
States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d at 295; 
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated De-
cember 18, 1981 and January 4, 1989, 561 
F.Supp. 1247, 1257 (E.D.N.Y.1982); GAF 
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 85 F.R.D. 
46, 51-52 (S.D.N.Y.1979); 8 Wright and 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 2024 at 209-10 (1970). However, courts 
are sometimes willing to preserve the work 
product protection, as well as the more 
restricted attorney/client privilege, in situ-
ations where the disclosure was essentially 
compelled. See e.g. Transamerica Com-
puter Co. Inc. v. International Business 
Machines Corp., 573 F.2d at 651; Simpson 
v. Braider, 104 F.R.D. at 522-23; see also 
Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi 
Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105-06 
(S.D.N.Y.1985). 
The parties advance many compelling ar-
guments in support of their respective posi-
tions concerning discovery of the prudence 
documents. Two points are of particular 
relevance to the court's decision in this 
matter (1) the President of plaintiff Niaga-
ra Mohawk, William Donlon, appears to 
have been cognizant of the potential for an 
adversarial legal relationship with SWEC, 
and (2) the plaintiffs were required to re-
spond to the PSC's interrogatories under 
penalty of perjury. 
[101 The plaintiffs have waived the 
work product protection with respect to the 
Project Management Book. This doc-
ument, though the brainchild of the plain-
tiffs, was written by Stone & Webster En-
gineering Corporation in accordance with 
an outline provided by the plaintiffs. The 
P.M. Book was not placed in the possession 
of SWEC by a process which could be 
termed excusable inadvertence, see e.g. 
United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d at 1417, or 
through force of compulsion. See Trans-
america Computer Co. v. International 
Business Machines Corp., 573 F.2d at 651. 
The document was developed over the 
course of many years and during a time 
when the PSC had not yet initiated the 
prudence proceeding. Moreover, plaintiffs 
were apparently cognizant of the potential 
for an adversary legal relationship with 
SWEC. Under such circumstances the 
plaintiffs could have created the P.M. Book 
without SWEC directly assisting in draft-
ing the document The P.M. Book was, 
therefore, treated in a manner which "sub-
stantially increased] the opportunity for 
potential adversaries to obtain the informa-
tion." In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dat-
ed December 18, 1981 and January 4* 
198% 561 F.Supp. at 1257. Under these 
circumstances, this court concludes that 
plaintiffs have waived the protection cover-
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ing the P.M. Book; it is properly the sub-
ject of discovery. 
[11] This court holds, however, that the 
draft answers to the PSC's interrogatories 
have retained their protected status and 
therefore are not subject to discovery by 
the defendants. These documents were 
written by the plaintiffs' attorneys, for 
submission in an adversarial proceeding, 
and at the direction of a government agen-
cy to whom the Cotenants were legally 
responsible. Thus, the draft answers con-
tained the initial testing of legal opinions 
and theories by plaintiffs' counsel; this 
constitutes core work product material. 
See Hickman v. Taylor, 67 S.Ct at 393. 
Moreover, the plaintiffs were responsible 
for being able to substantiate the asser-
tions made in those documents under 
threat of perjury. Since SWEC was the 
architect/engineer and construction manag-
er of NMP2, it was the only party in a 
position to verify the factual assertions 
contained in the draft answers. Given the 
relatively short 120 day time period in 
which the Cotenants were required to de-
velop responses to the PSC's interrogato-
ries, practical circumstances required the 
Cotenants to disclose the draft answers to 
SWEC. Under these circumstances there 
was a "de facto compulsion" to disclose the 
protected work product in a manner similar 
to that in Transamerica Computer Co. v. 
International Business Machines Corp., 
573 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir.1978). 
[12] The consultant reports present a 
close question. On the one hand they were 
written by consultants to the plaintiffs in 
anticipation of litigation. This would nor-
mally subject the documents to the work 
product protection under Fed.R.Civ.P. 
26(bX3) and (4). However, these doc-
uments were turned over to SWEC to be 
reviewed for factual accuracy as well as 
edited for style. There is nothing in the 
record which indicates that the PSC re-
quired the consultant reports to be commis-
sioned or submitted as part of the prudence 
proceeding. These documents were not 
prepared under strict time constraints or 
the threat of perjury as were the draft 
responses to the PSC's interrogatories. 
Thus, the disclosure of these documents * 
SWEC was not under force of compulsio 
Given the evidence that the Preside! 
and Chief Executive Officer of Niaga 
Mohawk had serious doubts as to the pe 
formance of SWEC as far back as 1980 it 
apparent that this was a knowing disci 
sure to a potential adversary. As not 
above, such disclosure operates to war 
the work product protection. The Cote 
ants could have prevented the transfer 
the consultant reports to SWEC by l 
questing verification of the factual ass< 
tions contained in the reports while keepii 
the reports themselves confidential. T 
transfer of consultant reports to SWEC 
1984 and 1985 was a disclosure of confide 
tial information that was neither necessa 
or compelled. Therefore, the court deni 
plaintiffs motion to have the consults 
reports returned. Those reports w« 
treated in a manner inconsistent with 1 
maintenance of the attorney work prodi 
protection and are now properly the subj< 
of discovery. 
B. The Donlon Deposition 
The plaintiffs have moved for a prot 
tive order, pursuant to Rule 26(c), to p 
vent the deposition questioning of Willi 
Donlon concerning statements made in c 
tain prudence documents. The basis 
this motion is that those documents . 
protected as work product and, thus, def 
dant SWEC is barred from employing th 
in discovery. Now that the work prod 
protection issue is settled, it this com 
ruling that Mr. Donlon answer any qu 
tions which are based on prudence c 
uments which are not protected work pr 
uct Defendants are thus free to ask qu 
tions concerning the consultants report i 
the Project Management Book. Howei 
the defendants are precluded from inq 
ing into the draft answers to the PS 
interrogatories. 
C. HTs Motion to Compel Disclos 
[13] In opposition to HTs motion 
compel the prudence documents plaint 
argue (1) that the documents constat 
protected work product material which 
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maintained its protection as against SWEC 
and is therefore protected from disclosure 
to ITT (2) that work product which is 
shared with a litigation consultant main-
tains its protection as against third parties 
and (3) that ITT has failed to make the 
requisite showing under Rule 26(bX3) (that 
there is a substantial need and an inability 
without undue hardship to obtain the equiv-
alent of the prudence documents by other 
means). Plaintiffs assert that even should 
this court hold the work product protection 
waived as to SWEC, ITT should not be 
provided with the prudence documents. 
This, because such a denial of discovery 
would prejudice ITT only to the extent that 
any party who is denied access to an oppos-
ing party's work product is prejudiced. 
The Cotenants maintain that ITT possesses 
most of the facts relevant to this suit and 
that those underlying facts it desires are 
freely discoverable. Finally, plaintiffs as-
sert that as a large corporation with sophis-
ticated counsel, ITT has the resources to 
reconstruct a factual history of NMP2 suf-
ficient to litigate this action. Plaintiffs, 
however, are unable to cite case law which 
directly supports the proposition that the 
waiver of a plaintiffs work product protec-
tion as to one defendant does not waive the 
protection as to a second defendant in the 
same action. 
[14] Notwithstanding the Cotenants' as-
sertions, this court holds that ITT may 
proceed with discovery of the non-protected 
prudence documents under dispute in this 
motion to the same extent as SWEC. The 
P.M. Book was developed over the course 
of many years by persons intimately in-
volved in the construction of NMP2. It is 
clear that ITT, no matter what its re-
sources, would be "unable without undue 
hardship to obtain the substantial equiva-
lent of the materials by other means." 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(bX3). However, even if 
ITT could reconstruct such a document this 
court would still order disclosure. Equal 
access of both defendants to the prudence 
documents is necessary to place all parties 
on an equal footing. It would certainly be 
unfair to permit one defendant to employ 
documents in discovery and, potentially, at 
trial while barring a co-defendant from 
making use of the same documents. ITT 
would also be prejudiced by the delay'in-
volved in being required to piece together 
information which took years to compile 
and involved literally millions of doc-
uments. However, while ITT may discover 
and inquire into the non-protected work 
product material in the same manner as 
SWEC, it too must return or destroy any 
answers to the PSC interrogatories which 
it may have received in the course of this 
litigation. Defendants may retain their 
notes of the draft answers to the PSC 
interrogatories but they are barred from 
using of the notes in this litigation. 
D. The Agresta Deposition 
[15] The plaintiffs have moved for a 
protective order, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), 
to prevent the deposition of Steven J. 
Agresta. Mr. Agresta was counsel for the 
plaintiffs in. the prudence proceeding be-
fore the PSC. He has also been retained 
as trial counsel in the present litigation. 
SWEC has noticed the deposition of Mr. 
Agresta. Plaintiffs assert that the deposi-
tion of counsel should not be permitted 
unless there has been a showing that the 
information sought cannot be obtained by 
other means. This, because the attorney 
work product doctrine as well as practice 
consistent with our system of jurispru-
dence makes such a deposition an inappro-
priate method of discovering the desired 
information. 
SWEC wants to ask Mr. Agresta about a 
number of items which they claim are nei-
ther privileged nor protected, including the 
names of persons and the location of doc-
uments which Agresta relied upon when 
representing the plaintiffs in the prudence 
proceeding. Defendants also want to ques-
tion Mr. Agresta about specific statements 
which were made in the prudence doc-
uments in order to determine exactly what 
information supplied the basis for a partic-
ular statement Moreover, the defendants 
want to review the process by which the 
prudence documents were developed so 
that the credibility of the documents and 
the potential for impeachment of the state-
ments contained therein can be ascertained. 
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER v. STONE & WEBSTER ENG. 593 
at* M 125 F.RJ). 57S (N.D.N.Y. IM9) 
Defendants claim that there is no better 
person than Agresta for locating the 
sources of information relevant to this suit 
Defendants claim that they would not in-
quire into Agresta's mental impressions 
and legal conclusions with respect to these 
documents. 
The law on this issue seems to be moving 
toward a position where courts generally 
will permit the deposition of opposing coun-
sel only upon a showing of substantial need 
and only after alternate discovery avenues 
have been exhausted or proven impracti-
cal.4 That is so despite the fact that Fed.R. 
Civ.P. 30(a) does not afford attorneys any 
special protection from being deposed.5 
Courts have become critical of the increas-
ing use of depositions against opposing 
counsel. As stated in Shelton v. Ameri-
can Motors Corp.: 
Taking the deposition of opposing coun-
sel not only disrupts the adversarial sys-
tem and lowers the standards of the pro-
fession, but it also adds to the already 
burdensome time and cost of litigation. 
It is not hard to imagine additional pre-
trial delays to resolve work-product and 
attorney-client objections, as well as de-
lays to resolve collateral issues raised by 
the attorney's testimony. Finally, the 
practice of deposing opposing counsel de-
tracts from the quality of client represen-
tation. Counsel should be free to devote 
his or her time and efforts to preparing 
the client's case without fear of being 
interrogated by his or her opponent 
Moreover, the "chilling effect" that such 
practice will have on the truthful commu-
nications from the client to the attorney 
is obvious. 
805 F.2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir.1986). See 
N.F.A. Corp. v. Riverview Narrow Fab-
rics, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 83, 84-86 (M.D.N.C. 
1987); In re Arthur Treacher's Fran-
chisee Litigation, 92 F.R.D. 429, 437-39 
(E.D.Pa.1981); Walker v. United Parcel 
4. There are instances where the deposition of an 
attorney is clearly appropriate. This is usually 
where the attorney is a fact witness or an actor, 
the creator of non-privileged records, or the 
attorney's advice is used by the client as a de-
fense. See N.F.A. Corp. v. Riverview Narrow 
Fabrics. Inc., 117 F.R.D. S3, 85 n. 2 (M.D.N.C. 
1987) and cases cited therein. 
Services, 87 F.R.D. 360, 361-62 (E.D.Pa. 
1980). Moreover, the deposition of counsel 
increases the likelihood that the attorney 
will be called as a witness at trial. Under 
such circumstances the attorney would nor-
mally be disqualified from providing fur-
ther services. "N.YJud.Law, Disciplinary 
Rule 5-102(A) (McKinney 1975) of the Code 
of Professional Responsibility requires that 
when 'it is obvious that [a lawyer] . . . 
ought to be called as a witness on behalf ot 
his client, he shall withdraw from the con-
duct of the trial.'" United States v. 
McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 29 (2nd Cir.1984). 
This school of thought also asserts that 
the act of choosing which documents to 
review and which persons to interview is 
itself a reflection of a lawyer's thought 
process and, as such, is protected work 
product For example in Shelton the court 
held that where "the deponent is opposing 
counsel and has engaged in a selective pro-
cess of compiling documents from among 
voluminous files in preparation for litiga-
tion, the mere acknowledgment of the ex-
istence of those documents would reveal 
counsel's mental impressions which are 
protected as work product" Id. at 1326. 
To protect attorney work product, as well 
as for other prudential reasons, the Shel-
ton court limited the deposition of opposing 
counsel to situations where "the party 
seeking to take the deposition has shown 
that (1) no other means exist to obtain the 
information than to depose opposing coun-
sel . . . ; (2) the information sought is rele-
vant and nonprivileged; and (3) the infor-
mation is crucial to the preparation of the 
case." Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327 (8th Cu\ 
1986). There is no Second Circuit case 
directly on point The plaintiffs, however, 
cite Gould v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting 
Co., which in dicta stated that the Shelton 
court's concern with the deposition of op-
S. Fed.RXiv.P. 30(a) states simply states that 
tajfter commencement of the action, any party 
may take the testimony of any person, including 
a party, by deposition upon oral examination." 
Emphasis added. See Shelton v. American Mo-
tors Corp., 80S FJd 1323, 1327 (8th Cir.1986). 
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pos'nfe counsel is "generally well taken." 
825 F.2d 676, 680 n. 2 (2nd Cir.1987). 
In support of their request that Mr. 
Agresta submit to a deposition, SWEC first 
notes that Rule 30(a) does not provide oppo-
sition counsel with any special protection 
from being deposed. There is a basis in 
ease law for the position that an attorney 
cannot avoid a deposition by asserting that 
lie or she has no relevant, nonprivileged 
information, see Cooper v. Welch Foods, 
Inc., 105 F.R.D. 4, 6 (W.D.N.Y.1984); Shin-
er v. American Stock Exchange, 28 F.R.D. 
34, 35 (S.D.N.Y.1961), and that, at a mini-
mum, the attorney must submit to a deposi-
tion so that his lack of knowledge may be 
bested and any claimed privilege placed on 
the record, any motion for a protective 
order at this time being premature. Hunt 
Intern. Resources Corp. v. Binstein, 98 
P.R.D. 689, 690 (N.D.I11.1983); Scovill 
Manufacturing Company v. Sunbeam 
Corporation, 61 F.R.D. 598, 603 (D.Del. 
1973); Shiner v. American Stock Ex-
change, 28 F.R.D. at 35. Respected com-
mentators have also asserted that the at-
torney's knowledge concerning the facts 
and sources of information relied upon in 
creating work product are not protected 
work product and may properly be the sub-
ject of discovery. According to Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Civil § 2023, p 194 (1970): 
The courts have consistently held that 
the work product concept furnishes no 
shield against discovery, by interrogato-
ries or by deposition, of the facts that 
the adverse party's lawyer has learned, 
or the persons from whom he has 
learned such facts, or the existence or 
nonexistence of documents, even though 
the documents themselves may not be 
subject to discovery. 
Under this view Mr. Agestra would proba-
bly be subject to deposition by Stone & 
Webster to find out about the people and 
documents he relied upon while drafting 
the prudence proceeding papers. This 
court also notes the strong dissent in the 
Shelton case which argued that the attor-
ney deposition should be allowed in order 
to discover the existence of documents-
citing the rule as espoused by Wright & 
Miller. 
This court finds that due in part to tne 
potential for the invasion of privileged or 
protected material, as well as for other 
prudential reasons discussed above, a pro-
tective order, pursuant to Rule 26(c) should 
issue to stay the deposition of Mr. Agresta. 
"Because deposition of a party's attorney is 
usually both burdensome and disruptive, 
the mere request to depose a party's attor-
ney constitutes good cause for obtaining a 
Rule 26(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., protective order." 
N.F.A. Corp. v. Riverview Narrow Fab-
rics, Inc., 117 P.R.D. at 85. Plaintiffs ar-
gue effectively that the same information 
which is sought in the deposition of Mr. 
Agresta can be obtained through interroga-
tories. Niagara Mohawk also cites Rule 
30(b)(6) as a feasible alternative to Stone & 
Webster's request to depose Mr. Agresta. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(bX6) provides that a party 
may name a corporation as the deponent 
"and describe with particularity the mat-
ters on which examination is requested." 
The corporation then must designate a per-
son to testify on behalf of the corporation 
and the matters on which that person will 
testify. If Niagara Mohawk conducts dis-
covery in good faith these devices should 
be sufficient 
If it should appear that defendants' fu-
ture discovery progress has been frustrat-
ed by plaintiffs' intransigence, and other 
federal discovery procedures have proven 
to be futile, the defendants may always 
return to the court for appropriate relief. 
IV. Conclusion 
This court hereby 
ORDERS, that: 
(1) the motion by plaintiff Niagara Mo-
hawk for a protective order, pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), to prevent the deposi-
tion of Steven J. Agresta is GRANTED; 
(2) the motion by defendant Stone & 
Webster Engineering Corporation for an 
order, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a), com-
pelling William J. Donlon to answer certain 
deposition questions is GRANTED to the 
extent that he is not questioned concerning 
statements made in documents which have 
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been classified as the draft answers to PSC 
interrogatories; 
(3) the cross motion by plaintiffs, under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), for a protective order 
precluding the defendants use and/or re-
tention of documents which have been 
termed "prudence documents" is GRANT-
ED in part and DENIED in part as de-
scribed in the body of this opinion; and 
(4) the motion by ITT to compel the pro-
duction of certain documents, pursuant to 
Rule 37(a) Fed.R.Civ.P., is GRANTED in 
part and DENIED in part as described in 
the body of the opinion. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
MTNllMtflSYSIIML 5> 
Jose VENTURA, on behalf of himself 
and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated. Plaintiffs, 
v. 
NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOS-
PITALS CORPORATION, a municipal 
entity, Woodhull Hospital, a hospital 
facility within and part of the New 
York City Health and Hospitals Corpo-
ration, Doctor Benker, Chief/Head of 
Employee Health Services Unit of the 
Woodhull Hospital, Carlos Loran, Ad-
ministrator of the Woodhull Hospital 
Facility, Doctor Jo Ivey Bofford, Chief 
Operating/Executive Officer of the 
New York City Health and Hospitals 
Corporation, Defendants. 
No. 88 Civ. 0334 (JMW). 
United States District Court, 
S.D. New York. 
Jan. 11, 1989. 
Employee who brought civil rights ac-
tion challenging hospital's drug testing pol-
icies moved for order certifying action as 
class action. The District Court, Walker, 
J., held that action would be conditionally 
certified as class action, with class com-
prised of all employees of hospital facilities 
previously subjected to drug testing with-
out their consent, pending further dis-
covery relating to numerosity of class 
members. 
Motion conditionally granted. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure *»172 
When considering whether to certify 
class, court should take allegations of mer-
its of case, as set forth in complaint, to be 
true. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(a), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure «=»172 
Party seeking class certification has 
burden of establishing that prerequisites of 
class action rule are satisfied. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 23(a), 28 U.S.C.A. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure «=»184.5 
Employee's action challenging hospi-
tal's drug testing policies would be condi-
tionally certified as class action, although 
employee lacked knowledge as to exact 
number of employees subjected to drug 
testing without their consent, where hospi-
tal had means to identify which employees 
were tested for drugs, and which consent 
forms, if any, were given to each employee 
tested, and thus employee could obtain 
such information through discovery. Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(a), 28 U.S.OA. 
4. Federal Civil Procedure *»163 
Plaintiffs lack of knowledge as to ex-
act number of affected persons is not bar 
to maintaining class action, when defen-
dants have means to identify those persons 
at will. Fed.Rules Civ.ProcRule 23(a), 28 
U.S.OA. 
5. Federal Civil Procedure «»184.5 
Employee's assertion that at least 100 
hospital employees, and numerous other 
hospital employees working in similar facil-
ities had been subject to drug testing with-
out their consent, was sufficient to satisfy 
numerosity requirement for obtaining class 
certification in action challenging hospital's 
drug testing policies. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 
Rule 23(a), 28 U.S.OA. 
444 120 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS 
Plaintiffs counsel asserts that at no 
point during these pre-filing contacts did 
defendants' counsel expressly deny the fac-
tual allegations of the complaint As such, 
plaintiffs counsel argues that the lack of a 
denial inferentially supported plaintiffs be-
lief that its factual allegations were "well 
grounded in fact." 
Research has uncovered no Rule 11 cases 
which involved similar circumstances. It 
may be argued that, by giving defendants 
a pre-filing opportunity to deny the factual 
allegations in the complaint, plaintiff was 
engaging in the type of careful investiga-
tion that Rule 11 requires. Several factors 
weigh against this conclusion, however. 
First, plaintiffs counsel apparently never 
asked defense counsel about the factual 
basis for the complaint; rather, plaintiffs 
sole purpose in forwarding the complaint 
evidently was to encourage settlement of 
all disputes between the parties. It, there-
fore, is difficult to construe defendants' 
failure to deny the factual allegations as an 
implicit acknowledgement of their truth. 
Second, plaintiffs counsel admitted during 
the oral argument of this motion that de-
fendants had, in substance, previously de-
nied similar allegations of antitrust viola-
tions. Indeed, plaintiffs counsel stated 
that, even had defendants expressly denied 
the factual allegations, he likely would not 
have believed them. Third, accepting plain-
tiffs argument could effectively shift the 
burden of compliance with Rule 11. In 
every case in which advance notice of a 
lawsuit was provided, the party receiving 
such notice would be required to make 
point-by-point denials of the complaint's 
factual allegations or risk waiving the abili-
ty to seek Rule 11 sanctions. Neither the 
language nor the purpose of the 1983 
amendments to Rule 11 supports such a 
result 
B. Selection of Sanctions 
Because the Court concludes that Rule 
11 has been violated, the imposition of 
sanctions is required. See Westmoreland, 
770 F.2d at 1174-75. The selection of an 
appropriate sanction, however, is left to the 
discretion of the district court Id. at 1178. 
Rule 11 provides for an award of expenses 
"incurred because of the filing of the plead-
ing, motion, or other paper." Thus, courts 
typically require the party who has violated 
Rule 11 to compensate the opposing party 
for his attorneys' fees and costs related to 
responding to the improper pleading. See 
Westmoreland, 770 F.2d at 1178-79; East-
way Construction Corp. v. City of New 
York, 762 F.2d at 254 n. 7; Hudson v. 
Moore Business Forms, Inc., 609 F.Supp. 
467, 484-85 (N.D.Cal.1985). 
[5] The Court has carefully reviewed 
the detailed statement of attorney's fees 
and expenses submitted by defendants and 
concludes that the amount requested is ex-
cessive. From the outset of this case, de-
fendants insisted that no foundation exist-
ed for plaintiffs allegations. Neverthe-
less, defendants' counsel launched a full-
scale assault on all the legal issues raised 
by the complaint. Five attorneys and addi-
tional paralegals spend countless hours re-
searching a variety of antitrust, class certi-
fication, Rule 11, and factual issues; how-
ever, the results of much of that research 
were not reasonably necessary to achieve 
dismissal of the case. Such a response was 
unreasonably disproportionate. 
Particularly unreasonable were defend-
ants' research efforts regarding class certi-
fication. While the issue might ultimately 
have been presented for the Court's deter-
mination, defendants' insistence that plain-
tiff had failed to state a claim rendered the 
certification issue secondary. Legal ef-
forts regarding that issue would have been 
appropriate only after plaintiffs complaint 
survived a 12(b)(6) challenge, which it did 
not. 
In addition, the Court finds excessive the 
staffing of this case by defendants' counsel 
and the amount of research effort devoted 
to the Rule 11 issue and motion to dismiss. 
The repeated travels of one associate from 
Chicago to Washington seem especially un-
reasonable. This associate's many hours 
of research and writing on Rule 11 and the 
repeated review of his work by at least 
three other attorneys unjustifiably multi-
plied the amount of effort required to pro-
duce a superior brief on this issue. 
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For the reasons outlined above, the 
Court finds that an award of $32,103.78 is 
appropriate as a sanction for violation of 
Rule 11. 
[6] The sole remaining question is ap-
portionment of the sanction. As plaintiffs 
counsel noted, plaintiff relied entirely on 
the advice of its attorneys in prosecuting 
this case. However, a party is not ab-
solved of responsibility under Rule 11 sim-
ply because he is ignorant of the law. 
Danik authorized the prosecution of this 
lawsuit albeit on the advice of counsel and 
must assume some of the burden of sanc-
tions. For this reason, counsel for Danik— 
the law firm of Cooter & Gell—will be 
assessed a sanction of $21,402.52 and Dan-
ik will be required to pay the remaining 
amount of $10,701.26. Because counsel for 
Hartmarx has already been paid its fees, 
the sanctions shall be paid directly to Hart-
marx. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Court concludes that, under the ob-
jective test used in assessing Rule 11 mo-
tions, plaintiff failed to make a "reasonable 
inquiry" into the factual allegations con-
tained in the complaint. The record estab-
lishes that plaintiff made an inadequate 
investigation of its claim that defendants 
maintained an exclusive retailer agency 
policy, and that plaintiff made no investiga-
tion into its claims of price-fixing, resale 
price maintenance, and other anticompeti-
tive practices. While Danik's counsel is 
primarily responsible for this neglect, Dan-
ik authorized this lawsuit and must bear a 
portion of the sanction. 
ORDER 
Upon consideration of defendants' Mo-
tion for Sanctions Pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the oppositions 
thereto, and the record herein, and for the 
reasons stated in the accompanying memo-
randum, it is this 25th day of February, 
1988 
ORDERED that defendants' motion be, 
and hereby is, granted; and it is further 
ORDERED that the law firm of Cooter 
& Gell shall forthwith pay to the Hartmarx 
Corporation Twenty-One Thousand Four 
Hundred Fifty-Two Dollars and Fifty-Two 
Cents ($21,452.52) as a sanction for violat-
ing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11; 
and it is further 
ORDERED that Danik, Incorporated 
shall forthwith pay to the Hartmarx Corpo-
ration Ten Thousand Seven Hundred One 
Dollars and Twenty-Six Cents ($10,701.26) 
as a sanction for violating Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 11. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR TECHNICAL 
AMENDMENT 
The Motion of Danik, Inc. for Technical 
Amendment of the Memorandum dated 
February 25, 1988, having come before the 
Court without opposition of Hartmarx Cor-
poration, it is hereby ORDERED that the 
said Memorandum shall be amended to re-
flect that H. Kenneth Kudon was not in the 
law firm of Cooter & Gell and did not 
represent Danik at the time the complaint 
was prepared or filed in the captioned case, 
and did not violate Rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Civ. A. No. 87-053&-S. 
United States District Court, 
D. Massachusetts. 
June 6, 1988. 
Plaintiff sought protective order com-
pelling defendant to return copies of doc-
uments which were protected by attorney-
client privilege and which plaintiff turned 
446 120 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS 
over to defendant allegedly inadvertently 
as part of document production in case. 
The District Court, Robert B. Collings, 
United States Magistrate, held that disclo-
sure of documents protected by attorney-
client privilege operated as waiver of attor-
ney-client privilege as to any documents 
disclosed by inadvertence, and therefore, 
plaintiff was not entitled to return of inad-
vertently disclosed documents. 
Order denied. 
Federal Civil Procedure <s=»1600.4 
Disclosure of documents protected by 
attorney-client privilege in course of pre-
trial discovery in which documents were 
being produced pursuant to Rule 34 operat-
ed as waiver of attorney-client privilege as 
to any documents disclosed by inadvert-
ence, and therefore, disclosing party was 
not entitled to return of inadvertently dis-
closed documents. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 
Rule 34, 28 U.S.C.A. 
Joel Lewin, Dennis M. Ryan, Elissa Ton-
kin, Hinckley, Allen, Snyder & Comen, Bos-
ton, Mass., for plaintiff. 
Robert J. Stillman, William L. Patton, 
Ropes & Gray, Boston, Mass., for defend-
ant 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON IN-
TERNATIONAL DIGITAL SYSTEMS 
CORPORATION'S MOTION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER (# 36) 
ROBERT B. COLLINGS, United 
States Magistrate. 
The plaintiff International Digital Sys-
tems Corporation (hereinafter, "IDSC") 
seeks a protective order compelling the de-
fendant, Digital Equipment Corporation 
1. DEC claims that the disclosure operated not 
only as a waiver of the documents actually 
disclosed but also as to undisclosed documents 
otherwise subject to the privilege but which 
bear on the same subject-matter. I rejected 
DECs claim in this regard by an endorsement 
on its motion to compel dated May 31, 1988 
denying the motion; I can find no case in which 
an unintentional or inadvertent disclosure has 
been found to be a waiver of the privilege as to 
undisclosed documents concerning the same 
(hereinafter, "DEC"), to return copies of 
twenty documents which are protected by 
the attorney-client privilege but Vhich 
IDSC turned over to DEC, allegedly inad-
vertently, as part of the document produc-
tion in this case. The issue is whether the 
disclosure by IDSC is to be held to be a 
waiver of the privilege as to the documents 
disclosed. 
There is no dispute that the documents 
are protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege if the privilege has not been waived. 
There is also no dispute that the disclosure 
was "inadvertent," at least in the sense 
that it was not an intentional or purposeful 
disclosure. From this it follows that IDSC 
did not disclose the documents for the pur-
pose of gaining an advantage for itself, or, 
put another way, for "offensive" purposes. 
See AMCA International Corporation v. 
Phipard, 107 F.R.D. 39, 43-44 (D.Mass., 
1985).1 
DEC served the request for documents in 
May, 1987. IDSC claims that the request 
was very broad and necessitated a review 
of 500,000 of IDSC's documents. The sort-
ing, reviewing and copying of the request-
ed documents was supervised by Attorney 
Gary A. Cohen who was assisted by three 
paralegals from his law firm2 and the en-
tire staff of IDSC comprising thirteen em-
ployees. A week after receipt of the doc-
ument request, IDSC moved its offices to 
another location in Manchester, New 
Hampshire; so far as appears, no review of 
documents began until after the move to 
the new location. 
In the new location, a conference room 
was set aside as a central area where doc-
uments could be reviewed and copied. The 
three paralegals were instructed by Attor-
ney Cohen as to the "parameters" of the 
subject matter. See Standard Chartered Bank 
PLC v. Ayala International Holdings, 111 F.R.D. 
76, 85 (S.D.N.Y., 1986); Parkway Gallery v. Kit-
tinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 116 F.R. 
D. 46, 53 (M.D.N.C., 1987). 
2. The law firm which represented the plaintiff 
at the time at which the document production 
took place is not the same law firm which 
presently represents the plaintiff. 
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work product rule and the attorney-client 
privilege and were instructed to "err on the 
side of caution" in choosing documents 
which should be withheld. Affidavit of At-
torney Gary A. Cohen, Etc. (# 38) at 119. 
The paralegals affixed different colored 
"post-its" to documents which were to be 
withheld or to documents about which they 
had questions. When the documents were 
copied, the "post-its" were affixed to the 
copies which were then shipped to the of-
fice of Attorney Cohen's law firm in Bos-
ton. Pink "post-its" were affixed to doc-
uments which were to be withheld on 
grounds of work product or attorney-client 
privilege; yellow "post-its" were placed on 
documents as to which the paralegals had 
questions. Affidavit, Etc. (#38) at 1113. 
By late August, 1987, copies of all rele-
vant documents in IDSC's possession, both 
privileged and unprivileged, had been as-
sembled in the law firm's Boston office; 
the documents totalled ninety cases. The 
entire set of copies was then shipped to Sir 
Speedy, a professional copying company, to 
be Bates-stamped and duplicated in identi-
cal form. In September, the duplicate set 
of copies was returned to the law firm's 
office, with the documents bearing the 
same labels as to what was privileged. Af-
fidavit, Etc. (# 38) at 111118-19. 
So far as I can glean from Attorney 
Cohen's affidavit, no segregation of attor-
ney-client or work product material was 
made until after Sir Speedy had Bates-
stamped the copies which had been shipped 
to the law firm and had then made a dupli-
cate set of those documents. In other 
words, it was only the pink or yellow "post-
its" on the copies which had been shipped 
from Manchester to the law firm which 
identified documents which would be with-
held. 
Attorney Cohen avers that the "last 
phase of screening" for privileged doc-
uments took place under his supervision 
and comprised two steps: 
First, the complete document index pre-
pared by the paralegals during the New 
Hampshire phase was reviewed. This 
review, together with an examination of 
the boxes which were marked with 
"Post-it" stickers, confirmed that privi-
leged documents were concentrated in 
groups distributed throughout the ninety 
cartons we were preparing to produce. 
Next, the entire contents of every folder 
identified by sticker as containing one or 
more pages of privileged matter was 
carefully reviewed again. As a result of 
this two-part screening process, approxi-
mately 2,600 documents were withheld 
on grounds of privilege. 
Affidavit, Etc. (# 38) at II 20. 
From this I gather that there was no 
plenary review of all the documents to cull 
out those which had pink or yellow "post-
its" on them. Instead, reliance was placed 
on the "document index." However, there 
is nothing in Attorney Cohen's affidavit 
which indicates that the indices contained 
any notations as to whether a document 
was privileged or not; the only notation 
which is mentioned is the affixing of the 
pink or yellow "post-it" to the document 
itself. Next, Attorney Cohen speaks of 
examining "boxes" with "post-it" stickers 
on them. This is the first mention of any 
"post-it" stickers going on boxes in which 
privileged documents were kept; the only 
previous mention is of "post-its" being af-
fixed to the documents themselves. Then 
he avers that " . . . the entire contents of 
every folder identified by sticker as con-
taining one or more pages of privileged 
matter was carefully reviewed again" [and] 
"[a]s a result of this two-part screening 
process, approximately 2,600 documents 
were withheld on grounds of privilege." 
The problem with this explanation is that 
there is nothing in the affidavit to indicate 
that "folders" were marked with "post-its" 
if they contained privileged documents. As 
I stated, the only marking as to privileged 
documents which is mentioned in the affi-
davit is the placing of pink or yellow "post-
its" on the documents themselves, not on 
"folders" or "boxes." 
In sum, Attorney Cohen seems to have 
relied on "post-its" put on "folders" and/or 
"boxes" to determine whether or not any 
privileged documents were contained in the 
"folder" and/or "box." However, his affi-
davit contains no information as to how 
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these "po&t-its" came to be applied to the 
folders and/or boxes, by whom, and at 
what stage of the process. In addition, 
there is no description of how the privi-
leged documents were removed from the 
copies which Sir Speedy made and which 
were to be turned over to DEC; presum-
ably, these copies did not contain "post-its." 
Perhaps the privileged documents were 
culled from the original copies by "post-its" 
and then the documents with the same 
Bates numbers were culled from the copies 
Sir Speedy made. I am not told. 
What is clear is that DEC received twen-
ty documents comprising eighty-eight 
pages which were privileged and confiden-
tial. DEC represents that all of the doc-
uments came from one of the boxes, i.e., 
the box which was numbered 42. The 
eighty-eight pages of documents have been 
submitted to the Court as Exhibit C to the 
Affidavit Of Robert Stillman (# 41).3 The 
documents should have appeared to any 
paralegal as being privileged. One doc-
ument, comprising twenty-five pages, is a 
transcript of an interview of IDSC's Presi-
dent conducted by Attorney Cohen himself; 
several other documents are enclosures to 
cover letters written on the law firm's sta-
tionery. There is also a thirty-two page 
draft complaint in this action with commen-
tary. 
If the first step in the process was a 
review of the document index prepared by 
the paralegals, I do not see how these 
documents could have been overlooked if 
the description of the documents by the 
paralegals was even close to the mark. 
However, going on to step two, the most 
likely explanation for the failure to cull out 
these documents is that the pink or yellow 
"post-it" which was on the "box" numbered 
42 was either never put on the box, or was 
mistakenly removed, or was overlooked. 
This would seem to explain the fact that all 
3. The Affidavit Of Robert Stillman (#41) and 
attachments thereto have been impounded by 
the Court pursuant to an agreement of counsel 
for the parties. 
4. Neither of these courts had to decide the issue. 
In the Transamerica case, the Ninth Circuit held 
that there was no waiver because disclosure had 
been compelled and "a party does not waive the 
the privileged documents which were pro-
duced were found in that box. / 
The law to be applied to the question as 
to whether there has been a waiver of the 
privilege by inadvertent disclosure is not 
uniform, and there does not appear to be 
any controlling First Circuit case on the 
question. In Re Standard Financial 
Management Corp., 77 B.R. 324, 330 
(Bkrtcy, D.Mass., 1987); Transamerica 
Computer Company, Inc. v. Internation-
al Business Machines Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 
650 (9 Cir., 1978).4 
In Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance 
Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448, 451 (S.D. 
N.Y., 1955), the Court seems to hold that 
inadvertent disclosure can never result in a 
waiver because if the disclosure was inad-
vertent, there was no intention to waive the 
privilege and that one cannot waive the 
privilege without intending to do so. To 
the same effect is Kansas-Nebraska Natu-
ral Gas v. Marathon Oil Company, 109 
F.R.D. 12, 21 (D.Neb., 1983) in which the 
Court seems to indicate that an "inadver-
tent" disclosure would not operate as a 
waiver of the privilege unless the "failure 
to catch" a document prior to production of 
a mass of documents was a "deliberate" 
act or "the result of conscious but errone-
ous decision." 
On the other hand, the Court in Under-
water Storage, Inc. v. United States Rub-
ber Co., 314 F.Supp. 546, 548-49 (D.D.C., 
1970), in response to a claim of inadvertent 
disclosure, refused to look beyond the "ob-
jective fact" that the document was turned 
over to opposing counsel as part of doc-
ument production " . . . to determine wheth-
er the [partyj really intended to have the 
document examined." The Court reasoned 
that regardless of whether production was 
"inadvertent" or not, the "confidentiality" 
of the document was "breached" by the 
attorney-client privilege for documents which 
he is compelled to produce." 573 F.2d at 650-51 
(emphasis in original). In the Standard Finan-
rial case, the Bankruptcy Judge determined that 
there was no evidence that there was an attor-
ney-client relationship at the time the communi-
cation was made, and, thus, no privilege at-
tached to the communication. 77 B.R. at 330. 
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thereby destroying the basis sure of privileged documents. If the pre-disclosure, 
for the continued existence of the privi-
lege." Id. at 549. Magistrate Dwyer 
seems to follow the decision in Underwater 
Storage in the case of Chubb Integrated 
Systems v. National Bank of Washington, 
103 F.R.D. 52, 66-68 (D.D.C., 1984). 
Another line of cases follows a middle 
ground whereby inadvertent disclosures 
"may" or "may not" result in a waiver of 
the privilege depending on whether or not 
the party producing the documents * took 
precautions to protect the privilege. This 
doctrine seems to have originated in cases 
in which it was claimed that the privilege 
was waived when a party or attorney 
placed the documents in a place where 
third parties could view them. In Re Horo-
witz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2 Cir., 1973), cert 
denied, 414 U.S. 867, 94 S.Ct. 64, 38 L.Ed. 
2d 86 (1973); In Re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4 Cir., 1984); 
Suburban Sew N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-
Bemina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 258-60 (N.D. 
111., 1981); O'Leary v. Purcell Co., Inc., 
108 F.R.D. 641, 644 (M.D.N.C, 1985). 
Even though the doctrine does not seem 
to have originated in cases in which the 
disclosure was "inadvertent" during the 
course of a production of documents in 
litigation, it has been applied to this situa-
tion. Lois Sportswear, USA. v. Levi 
Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D. 
N.Y., 1985); Parkway Gallery v. Kitting-
er/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., su-
pra, 116 F.R.D. at 50. (M.D.N.C, 1987); 
Liggett Group v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205,207-08 (M.D. 
N.C., 1986). 
I do not find the application of this doc-
trine to "inadvertent" disclosure during 
document production in litigation particu-
larly useful. The reason is that the court 
applying the doctrine to this situation 
comes quite close to applying a per se rule 
or something akin to the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur. Put another way, the opin-
ions of the courts in these cases, after a 
substantial amount of verbiage, can be re-
duced to a bottom line to the effect that the 
precautions were inadequate because they 
were not effective in preventing the disclo-
cautions had been adequate, the disclosure 
would not have occurred. Frankly, I do 
not see this result as a significant advance 
in jurisprudence. 
Accordingly, I see little benefit to mak-
ing a judgment about the adequacy of the 
plaintiffs precautions. I have indicated 
where there were deficiencies, but I do not 
think I am saying any more than that the 
precautions were inadequate because they 
were ineffective in preventing the disclo-
sure. 
In addition, I see little benefit to doing a 
painstaking evaluation of the precautions 
taken by plaintiffs counsel when it is noted 
that the whole basis for the privilege is to 
maintain the confidentiality of the doc-
ument. It cannot be doubted that the con-
fidentiality of the document has been de-
stroyed by the "inadvertent" disclosure no 
less than if the disclosure had been pur-
poseful; it equally cannot be doubted that 
the confidentiality of the communication 
can never be restored, regardless of wheth-
er the disclosure was "inadvertent" or pur-
poseful. In other words, regardless of how 
painstaking the precautions, there is no 
order I can enter which erases from de-
fendant's counsel's knowledge what has 
been disclosed. There is no order which 
can remedy what has occurred, regardless 
of whether or not the precautions were 
sufficient. 
Plaintiff suggests that a protective order 
be issued prohibiting the defendant from 
"using" the documents, a sort of "use im-
munity." I reject the suggestion because I 
do not see what purpose would be served. 
Such an order would not restore the confi-
dential nature of the document The most 
that can be said is that it would prohibit the 
defendant's attorneys from using doc-
uments to which they were not entitled in 
the first place. But as I see it, the only 
reason that the defendant received the doc-
ument in the first place is because the 
precautions were insufficient. 
In sum, I agree with the Court in the 
case of Underwater Storage, Inc. v. Unit-
ed States Rubber Company, supra. 
When confidentiality is lost through "inad-
450 0 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS 
vertent" disclosure, the Court should not 
look at the intention of the disclosing party. 
314 F.Supp. at 549. It follows that the 
Court should not examine the adequacy of 
the precautions taken to avoid "inadver-
tent" disclosure either. 
I also agree with the Bankruptcy Court 
in the case of In Re Standard Financial 
Management Corp., supra. Despite theo-
retical arguments to the contrary, "... in 
the real world, unforced disclosure is dis-
closure and should support the waiver ar-
gument" 77 B.R. at 330. "[M]istake or 
inadvertence is, after all, merely a euphem-
ism for negligence, and, certainly . . . one is 
expected to pay a price for one's negli-
gence." Id. 
In this latter vein, a strict rule that "in-
advertent" disclosure results in a waiver of 
the privilege would probably do more than 
anything else to instill in attorneys the 
need for effective precautions against such 
disclosure. 
Considering all the facts and circum-
stances, I rule that disclosure5 of doc-
uments protected by the attorney-client 
privilege in the course of pre-trial discovery 
in which documents are being produced 
pursuant to Rule 34, F.R.Civ.P., operates 
as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege 
as to any documents disclosed by "inad-
vertence." I find that such a rule is most 
consistent with the purposes of the privi-
lege, and the interest of the administration 
of justice generally. 
For all these reasons, it is ORDERED 
that International Digital Systems Corpora-
tion's Motion For Protective Order (#36) 
be DENIED. 
S. That is, disclosure which is not compelled. 
See Transamerica Computer Company, Inc. v. 
Dimitrios AVRAMIDIS, et ah, Plaintiff, 
v. 
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, et 
al., Defendants. 
Civ. A. No. 85-3972-WD. 
United States District Court, 
D. Massachusetts. 
June 15, 1988. 
Gasoline franchisees brought action 
against former and current franchisors for 
alleged violations of Petroleum Marketing 
Practices Act. On plaintiffs motion to 
compel discovery, the District Court, Joyce 
London Alexander, United States Magis-
trate, held that: (1) relevant geographic 
market for discovery purposes consisted of 
all retail marketing districts which included 
Massachusetts franchises, and (2) fran-
chisor was required to specify, in sufficient 
detail, records sought by franchisees, so 
that franchisees could inspect and/or copy 
records. 
Ordered accordingly. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure e=»1503 
Relevant geographic market area, for 
purpose of determining permissible scope 
of interrogatories propounded by gasoline 
franchisees in their Petroleum Marketing 
Practices Act against franchisors, consisted 
of all retail marketing districts containing 
Massachusetts franchisees, in that action 
involved only Massachusetts franchises. 
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 
§ 101(16), 15 U.S.C.A § 2801(16). 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=»1534 
Where defendant's business records 
which were relevant to answering plain-
tiffs interrogatories were housed out of 
state, and many file cabinets were used to 
store those records, defendant was re-
quired to specify, in sufficient detail, 
records sought by plaintiff, so that plaintiff 
could then go to where records were stored 
to inspect and/or copy them. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 33(c), 28 U.S.C.A. 
International Business Machines Corp* supra, 
573 F.2d at 650. 
AVRAMIDIS v. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. 
CIUM 120 FJLD. 450 (DJVUs*. 1988) 451 
Myles Jacobson, Marc A. Friedman, 
Thompson, Thompson, Nagel & Jacobson, 
Springfield, Mass., for plaintiff Vincent 
Cuttone. 
William G. Lowerre, Shell Oil Co. Legal 
Dept, Houston, Tex., and Stephen J. 
Brake, Nutter, McClennan & Fish, Boston, 
Mass., for defendant Shell Oil Co. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF VINCENT CUT-
TONE'S MOTION TO COMPEL AN-
SWERS TO INTERROGATORIES BY 
SHELL OIL COMPANY 
JOYCE LONDON ALEXANDER, 
United States Magistrate. 
Plaintiffs, gasoline franchisees, brought 
this action against defendants, former and 
current franchisors, under the Petroleum 
Marketing Practices Act ("PMPA"). Plain-
tiff Vincent Cuttone's instant motion to 
compel seeks responses to certain interrog-
atories, Numbers 1, 2, 8 and 10, propound-
ed to defendant Shell Oil Company. The 
dispute here is twofold: 1) plaintiff and 
defendant disagree as to the scope of the 
relevant geographical market; and 2) plain-
tiff and defendant disagree as to who 
shoulders the responsibility, under Fed.R. 
Civ.P. 33(c), to inspect the many files con-
taining documents and identify those re-
sponsive to plaintiffs interrogatories. 
RELEVANT GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET 
Under the PMPA, 15 U.S.C. § 2801(16), 
the term "relevant geographic market 
area" is defined as "including] a State or a 
1. Interrogatory Number 1 states: 
Identify all pending and concluded lawsuits in 
which Shell Oil Co. (hereinafter "Shell") is a 
defendant and in which a claim based on rent 
charged to a franchisee is made. 
2. Interrogatories Numbers 2 and 10 state: 
Interrogatory Number 2: For the period from 
January 1985 to date, state the total number 
of service stations in the New England Retail 
Marketing District and the Hartford Retail 
Marketing District as to which an "adjust-
ment'' to the VRP, contract rent or optimum 
volume was made in accordance with the 
procedure described in paragraph 13 of the 
Affidavit of J. William Schutzenhofer, and 
identify each station, giving its mailing ad-
dress, the name of the adjustment, the period 
covered by the franchise, and the reasons for 
the adjustment. 
standard metropolitan statistical area as 
periodically established by the Office of 
Management and Budget." Defendant 
contends that under this section, the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts alone consti-
tutes the relevant geographic market in the 
instant case, and thus plaintiff should be 
able to obtain the information he seeks as 
it concerns only other franchisee-dealers 
operating in Massachusetts. Plaintiff, on 
the other hand, contends that under the 
Act, the issue is whether Shell, as Atlantic 
Richfield's ("ARCO") successor franchisor, 
offered a franchise to plaintiff which was 
discriminatory when compared to Shell's 
existing franchises, and the question 
should be answered without geographical 
limitation. See Memorandum of Plaintiff 
in Support of Motion to Compel (# 190), 
5, 8. Plaintiff, therefore, asserts that de-
fendant's responses to plaintiffs interroga-
tories should not be limited to concern only 
franchisees in Massachusetts, but must 
provide information within a national scope 
for Interrogatory Number l.1 For Inter-
rogatories Numbers 2 and 102, plaintiff 
seeks information concerning dealers in the 
New England Retail Marketing District 
and the Hartford Retail Marketing District 
since Massachusetts dealers are split and 
included in either district There appears 
to be no dispute that information concern-
ing only Massachusetts dealers is all that is 
called for in Interrogatory Number 8.3 
[1] This Court finds that under 
§ 2801(16), the relevant geographic market 
area consists of both the New England and 
the Hartford Retail Marketing Districts. 
Interrogatory Number 10: For every Shell sta-
tion in the New England Retail Marketing 
District and the Hartford Retail Marketing 
District during the period from the begining 
(sic) of the earliest period considered in set-
ting the Plaintiffs contract rents to present, 
state the following: 
(a) The name and address of the station; 
(b) the name of the franchisee; 
(c) the Contract Rent; 
(d) the number of gallons per month pur-
chased; 
(e) the threshold volume. 
3. Interrogatory Number 8 states: 
As to each plaintiffs station, identify the exist-
ing Shell dealers deemed to be similar facili-
ties in the same area for purposes of initially 
computing the Contract Rents initially speci-
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If you wish to remain a member of 
ass, you need do nothing at this stage 
e proceedings 
If you wish to be excluded from the 
you must submit a written request 
xclusion For your convenience, the 
st for exclusion may be submitted on 
ttached form, entitled "Request for 
ision " If you received this notice by 
a Request for Exclusion form should 
accompanied it If you did not re-
a Request for Exclusion form, you 
obtain a copy by writing to the Clerk 
>urt, P 0 Box , Cincinnati, Ohio 
L A written Request for Exclusion 
be submitted without using the Re-
for Exclusion form, but it must refer 
e litigation as Ronald J Thompson, 
et al v Midwest Foundation Inde-
ent Physicians Association d/b/a 
ceCare, et al, No C-l-86-744, m-
your name and address, and the 
» and address of your chosen counsel if 
do not choose class counsel, in your 
ment requesting exclusion Any re-
t for exclusion must be received on or 
re October 23, 1987 by the clerk of the 
2d States District Court for the South-
District of Ohio at P 0 Box , Cm-
iti, Ohio 45201 
) The plaintiffs m this class action are 
ssented by two firms which have been 
oved as class counsel They are 
Stanley M Chesley, Esq 
TE, SCHNEIDER, BAYLESS & 
CHESLEY CO, LP A 
1513 Central Trust Tower 
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 
513-621-0267 
James R Cummins, Esq 
)WN, CUMMINS & BROWN CO., 
LPA 
500 Carew Tower, 441 Vine Street 
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 
513-381-2121 
13) The approved class representatives 
in this class action are 
John A Brunsman 
11325 Springfield Pike 
Cincinnati Ohio 45246 
Paul Grot* 
7320-A Kingsgate Way 
WestChester Ohio 45069 
John J Jaeger 
629 Oak Street 
Cincinnati Ohio 45206 
S George Lesinski 
629 Oak St. Suite 201 
Cincinnati Ohio 45206 
Richard T Marnell 
3333 Vine Street 
Cincinnati Ohio 45220 
Ronald J Thompson 
4452 Eastgate Boulevard 
Cincinnati Ohio 45242 
14) Examination of pleadings and pa-
pers This notice is not all inclusive Ref-
erences to pleadings and other papers and 
proceedings are only summaries For full 
details concerning the class action and the 
claims and defenses which have been as-
serted by the parties, you or your counsel 
may review the pleadings and other papers 
filed at the office of the Clerk of the United 
States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Ohio, Room 324, U S P O & Court-
house, 100 East Fifth Street, Cincinnati, 
Ohio 45202, on any business day from 9 00 
AM to 500 P M 
15) Interpretation of this Notice Ex-
cept as indicated in the orders and deci-
sions of the United States District Court 
for the Southern Distnct of Ohio, Western 
Division, no court has yet ruled on the 
merits of any of the claims or defenses 
asserted by the parties in this class action 
This notice is not an expression of an opin-
ion by the Court as to the merits of any 
claims or defenses This notice is being 
sent to you solely to inform you of the 
nature of the litigation, your rights and 
obligations as a class member, the steps 
required to be excluded from the class, the 
Court's certification of the class, and the 
forthcoming trial 
Daniel J Lyons, Jr 
Deputy Clerk 
United States District Court for 
the Southern Distnct of Ohio, 
Western Division 
Dated. 
BAXTER TRAVENOL LABORATORIES v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES 119 
Citea» 117 FR-D 119 (NO111 1987) 
1. Federal Civil Procedure <&=»1600.4 
Plaintiffs' failure to claim attorney-
client privilege for months after they knew 
that document had been produced waived 
privilege, if document was ever privileged 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=»1600.1 
Plaintiffs' vague statements about cir-
cumstances of conversation coupled with 
poor memory as to alleged pnvileged na-
ture of document to begin with were sim-
ply insufficient to sustain plaintiffs' belat-
ed claim of attorney client privilege with 
respect to document 
EXCLUSION REQUEST FORM 
Clerk 
United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio Western Division 
PO Box 
Cincinnati Ohio 45201 
Re Ronald J Thompson M D et al 
v 
Midwest Foundation Independent 
Physicians Association d/b/a 
ChoiceCare, et al 
No C-1-8&-744 
I hereby request to be excluded from the class action 




Name of Chosen Counsel 
Address 
CO | « Y HUM81H SYSTEM> 
BAXTER TRAVENOL LABORATO-
RIES, INC., Robert P Popovich, 
and Jack W. Moncnef, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES, Defendant 
No. 84 C 5103. 
United States Distnct Court, 
N D Illinois, E D 
May 26, 1987 
On Reconsideration July 22, 1987 
Patent action was brought Plaintiffs 
moved for return of document they claimed 
was pnvileged and was inadvertently pro-
duced The Distnct Court, Elaine E Buck-
lo, United States Magistrate, held that at-
torney-chent pnvilege was waived by plain-
tiffs' failure to claim pnvilege for several 
months after inadvertent production of doc-
ument, in face of defendant's repeated use 
On Reconsideration 
3. Federal Civil Procedure «=»1600.4 
Inadvertent production of otherwise 
privileged documents did not waive pnvi-
lege as to those documents, under protec-
tive order 
4. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>1600.4 
Delay in claiming attorney-client pnvi-
lege can result m waiver, even where initial 
production of allegedly pnvileged doc-
ument may have been inadvertent, it may 
be unfair and unrealistic to uphold the pnv 
liege, where documents have been exam-
ined and used by opposing party pnor to 
assertion of pnvilege 
5. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>1600.4 
Plaintiffs waived attorney-client pnvi-
lege in inadvertently produced document 
by failing to assert pnvilege for several 
months in face of defendant's repeated use 
of and reliance on document 
Granger Cook, Jr, Gary W McFarron, 
Cook, Wetzel & Egan, Ltd, Chicago, 111, 
for plaintiffs 
D Dennis Allegretti, Timothy J Malloy, 
Paul H Berghoff, Allegretti, Newitt, Wit-





BUCKLO, United States 
120 117 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS 
inadvertently produced. The parties 
agreed at the start of this litigation that 
inadvertent production of privileged doc-
uments would not waive any privilege. De-
fendant says, however, that this document 
has not been shown to be privileged, and 
that if it is, plaintiff did not inadvertently 
produce it. The document consists of some 
handwritten notes by Dr. Popovich, a plain-
tiff who is one of the inventors of the 
patents in issue. Defendant was allowed 
to inspect the notes and requested a copy 
of the document in August, 1986. Defend-
ant represents that it was told that plain-
tiffs' counsel had reviewed the documents 
for privileged material prior to production. 
Thereafter, defendant, taking note of the 
fact that Popovich makes the statement in 
the document that "Oreopouli (sic) invented 
this," referring to part of what plaintiffs 
are claiming as their own invention, quoted 
from and attached the document in various 
motions filed with the court in September, 
October and November, 1986. It is not 
denied that Popovich saw these motions 
and he was surely aware of the potential 
importance of the document as a very dam-
aging admission. 
Popovich says, however, that while he 
ivas aware of the fact that the document 
ted been produced, he did not remember 
Jiat the document consisted of notes of a 
£lephone conversation he had with his at-
»rney until he was preparing for his depo-
sition. He says he then remembered what 
,he notes were because the original doc-
lment had his attorney's telephone number 
>n it (If so, that document has not been 
)roduced to the court The document that 
have seen does not have a telephone 
lumber on it) 
Despite the fact that Popovich says that 
le belatedly remembered that the doc-
iment in question was privileged on the 
ve of his deposition, when questioned 
tbout it at his deposition, he did not claim 
>rivilege. 
[1] It seems clear that if the document 
n question was ever privileged, plaintiffs 
waived their privilege at some point in time 
ifter its production. Inadvertent means 
iccidental. Once Popovich knew the doc-
ument had been produced it was incumbent 
on him to say something. When he failed 
to do anything over a period of months, its 
continued production can no longer be 
deemed inadvertent Furthermore, Popo-
vich admits that in preparation for his dep-
osition he determined the document was 
privileged. Yet he failed to raise any claim 
of privilege at the deposition. I conclude 
that if the document was ever privileged, 
the privilege was waived by Popovich's fail-
ure to claim privilege for months after he 
knew that the document had been produc-
ed. 
[2] I also find that Popovich has failed 
to sustain his claim of privilege. The attor-
ney-client privilege is an exception to the 
rule that all relevant evidence should be 
disclosed in an adversary proceeding. As 
such, the courts repeatedly have warned 
that the privilege must be narrowly con-
strued. One seeking to rely on it bears the 
burden of proving that a document is in 
fact privileged. In this case, there is noth-
ing in the document itself to indicate any 
privilege. Popovich says that he does not 
know when the allegedly privileged conver-
sation took place. He did not remember 
that the notes were even of such a conver-
sation until months after he was aware of 
the production of the document. 
Popovich, the person claiming the privi-
lege, has the burden of proving privilege. 
In this case, Popovich's vague statements 
about the circumstances of the conversa-
tion coupled with his poor memory as to 
the alleged privileged nature of the doc-
ument to begin with, are simply insuffi-
cient to sustain his belated claim of privi-
lege. 
ON RECONSIDERATION 
Baxter moves for reconsideration of this 
court's order of May 26, 1987 denying Bax-
ter's motion to compel the return of a privi-
leged document Baxter produced the doc-
ument to Abbott in August 1986, asserted-
ly inadvertently. The court denied Bax-
ter's motion on the grounds that Baxter 
had waived any privilege it had in the doc-
ument In finding waiver, the court noted 
that Abbott had quoted the document in or 
TAYLOR v. 
Cite as 117 F.R.D. 
attached it to legal memoranda submitted 
to the court in September, October, and 
November without objection by Baxter, and 
that at his deposition, Popovich, who made 
the document, had not claimed the privi-
lege, although he claimed to have deter-
mined that the document was privileged 
prior to his deposition. 
[3] The last factor relied on was incor-
rect Transcripts show that at the deposi-
tion, Popovich's attorney did assert that the 
document was privileged. This does not, 
however, change the outcome of Baxter's 
motion. Under the protective order, inad-
vertent production of otherwise privileged 
documents does not waive the privilege as 
to those documents. Baxter asserts that 
its production of the document was inad-
vertent. The cases discussing whether pro-
duction was inadvertent consider such 
factors as the scope and volume of dis-
covery, the time available for review of the 
documents by the party asserting the privi-
lege, the adequacy of the party's proce-
dures for review, the time taken to rectify 
the error, and the overreaching issue of 
fairness and protection of the privilege. 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Gavey, 109 
F.R.D. 323, 330-31 (N.D.Cal.1985); Lois 
Sportwear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & 
Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y.1985). 
[4] Even where the initial production 
may have been inadvertent, however, delay 
in claiming the privilege can result in waiv-
er. Where prior to the assertion of the 
privilege, the documents have been exam-
ined and used by the opposing party, it may 
be unfair and unrealistic to uphold the priv-
ilege. In re Grand Jury Investigation of 
Ocean Transportation, 604 F.2d 672, 674-
75 (D.C.Cir.), cert denied sub nom, Sea-
Land Service, Inc. v. United States, 444 
U.S. 915, 100 S.Ct 229, 62 L.Ed.2d 169 
(1979). 
[5] Under these standards, Baxter's 
privilege was waived although it was as-
serted at the time of the deposition. The 
document Baxter claims is privileged was 
one document of among eight boxes of 
documents produced by Baxter for inspec-
tion in August. Baxter has not explained 
its procedures for reviewing documents for 
WAGNER 121 
121 (N.D.Ill. 1987) 
privilege prior to disclosure, but under the 
circumstances its initial production of the 
document may have been inadvertent. Cf 
Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc., supra, 104 
F.R.D. at 105 (where privilege is claimed as 
to only 22 documents out of 16,000 pages 
inspected and 3,000 pages requested to be 
produced, disclosure was inadvertent). 
However, upon Abbott's request, Baxter 
produced a copy of the document without 
objection in September, 1986, and Abbott 
thereafter quoted from the document and 
attached copies of it to its memoranda in 
September, October, and November. Popo-
vich was aware that the document had 
been produced, and of its potential impor-
tance, by September, 1986. By failing to 
assert the privilege until mid-December, in 
the face of Abbott's repeated use of and 
reliance on the document, Baxter waived 
any privilege it had in the document. 
Popovich has established that the doc-
ument was privileged. McLemore's Sup-
plemental Affidavit provides a reasonably 
precise date for the conversation, and also 
identifies the subject matter sufficiently 
that it appears the conversation involved 
the request for or provision of legal advice. 
However, the privilege was waived by Po-
povich's failure to claim the privilege until 
mid-December, 1986. 
s* w v 
(O IKEY NUMSEt SYSTEM > 
Renard TAYLOR, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Bruce WAGNER, Defendant 
No. 87 C 422. 
United States District Court, 
N.D. Illinois, E.D. 
Sept 18, 1987. 
Application was brought for Rule 11 
sanctions. The District Court, Bua, J., held 
